diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index a8b95d150..4cac8c498 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ All notable changes to NanoClaw will be documented in this file.
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
-- **The guard seam (guarded-actions phase 2).** Every privileged action crossing the container or channel boundary now passes ONE decision function — `guard()` in the new `src/guard/` leaf — before it executes: `allow`, `hold` (through the flow's existing approval mechanics), or `deny`. The keyed registries (ncl commands, delivery actions) wrap their handlers at registration, so the guarded path is the only path by construction: every ncl command derives its guard from its own definition inside `register()`, and a delivery action registers with a guard spec or an explicit `unguarded(<reason>)` declaration — omission doesn't compile, and `grep "unguarded("` is the complete justified inventory. The broadcast hooks (response handlers, message interceptors) stay plain registrations; the one privileged click path — channel registration — consults the guard inline in its handler, like the a2a route and the unknown-sender gate. Consults carry the branded `GuardedAction` value returned by `defineGuardedAction`, so a typo'd or dropped wiring is a compile error and a forged value is denied at runtime — never a fail-open. The structural baseline is today's checks verbatim (cli_scope enforcement, create_agent's scope branch, a2a destination ACL + `agent_message_policies` hold, self-mod unconditional hold, unknown_sender_policy, channel-registration click auth, host-as-trusted-caller in code). Policy-as-data (tighten-only rule sources composing with the baseline) is deferred to phase 3, where the generalized rules table arrives with its first operator-visible consumer. Approved replays now carry the verified approval row as a **grant** — the `approved: true` boolean is deleted — and the guard re-runs the structural baseline on every replay. Two outcome changes are inherent to that replay semantics and ship deliberately: **(a)** approving a held a2a message after its destination was revoked no longer delivers it (the live baseline re-check); **(b)** a forged, already-consumed, or wrong-action/wrong-payload grant refuses the replay instead of executing (previously any in-process caller passing `approved: true` executed). Zero rules ship by default — the seeded posture is today's behavior. (The D1/D2/D4 click-auth fixes from the guarded-actions defect inventory are NOT in this change — they belong to the approval-contract PR.)
-- **Guard conformance is now a boot invariant, not just a CI test.** The host refuses to start (upgrade-tripwire posture: clear banner + exit 1) when a guarded action that can hold has no registered approve continuation — the one cross-registry invariant the type system can't see, since catalog entries and approval handlers register from different modules. CI can't see skill-installed code — `/add-*` skills register handlers on machines where the test suite never runs — so the check (`src/guard-conformance.ts`) runs in `main()` before the host accepts a message, and a mis-composition crashes at skill-install time instead of at the first approved card. The old registry walk is deleted: everything it detected is now unconstructible at the registration API. Companion hardening: re-registering a guard-wrapped delivery action *without* a guard spec now throws at registration — previously that silently replaced the guarded handler while the catalog still reported the action as guarded.
+- **The guard seam (guarded-actions phase 2).** Every privileged action crossing the container or channel boundary now passes ONE decision function — `guard()` in the new `src/guard/` leaf — before it executes: `allow`, `hold` (through the flow's existing approval mechanics), or `deny`. The keyed registries (ncl commands, delivery actions) wrap their handlers at registration, so the guarded path is the only path by construction: every ncl command derives its guard from its own definition inside `register()`, and a delivery action registers with a guard spec or an explicit `unguarded(<reason>)` declaration — omission doesn't compile, and `grep "unguarded("` is the complete justified inventory. The broadcast hooks (response handlers, message interceptors) stay plain registrations; the one privileged click path — channel registration — consults the guard inline in its handler, like the a2a route and the unknown-sender gate. Consults carry the branded `GuardedAction` value returned by `defineGuardedAction`, so a typo'd or dropped wiring is a compile error and a forged value is denied at runtime — never a fail-open. The decision is today's checks verbatim (cli_scope enforcement, create_agent's scope branch, a2a destination ACL + `agent_message_policies` hold, self-mod unconditional hold, unknown_sender_policy, channel-registration click auth, host-as-trusted-caller in code). Policy-as-data (tighten-only rule sources composing with the decision) is deferred to phase 3, where the generalized rules table arrives with its first operator-visible consumer. Approved replays now carry the verified approval row as a **grant** — the `approved: true` boolean is deleted — and the guard re-runs the structural checks on every replay. Two outcome changes are inherent to that replay semantics and ship deliberately: **(a)** approving a held a2a message after its destination was revoked no longer delivers it (the checks re-run live); **(b)** a forged, already-consumed, or wrong-action/wrong-payload grant refuses the replay instead of executing (previously any in-process caller passing `approved: true` executed). Zero rules ship by default — the seeded posture is today's behavior. (The D1/D2/D4 click-auth fixes from the guarded-actions defect inventory are NOT in this change — they belong to the approval-contract PR.)
+- **Delivery-registry hardening.** Re-registering a guard-wrapped delivery action *without* a guard spec now throws at registration — previously that silently replaced the guarded handler while the catalog still reported the action as guarded. (The cross-registry pairing — every holding action has a registered approve continuation — is enforced by the conformance test; at runtime a missing continuation already resolves loudly, telling the requester no handler is installed.)
 - **Pre-task script failures back their series off instead of spinning.** A `--script` that errors lands the occurrence as a failed run (`script-skip:error` ack → `failed` status); recurrence reads the series' trailing failed streak and re-arms at `max(cron next, now + 2·2^(n−1) min, cap 60)`; after 8 consecutive failures the series is auto-paused with a host-written note in its run log (`ncl tasks resume` revives it). A deliberate `wakeAgent:false` gate is a normal run and never backs off. Also fixed: an explicitly-addressed `<message to>` in a task fire's final text now delivers as a deliberate send (previously suppressed as a turn-reply echo → zero delivery when the agent skipped the MCP tool); identical echoes of an MCP send are dropped in the runner, where the duplication originates.
 - [BREAKING] **Scheduled tasks moved from MCP tools to `ncl tasks`.** The six scheduling MCP tools are no longer exposed to agent containers; agents and operators manage tasks with `ncl tasks list/get/create/update/cancel/pause/resume/delete`. New tasks run from a per-agent-group system session rather than waking the chat session that created them, and task writes are not approval-gated inside the owning group. **Migration:** [docs/ncl-tasks-migration.md](docs/ncl-tasks-migration.md).
 - **Optional per-container resource caps.** `CONTAINER_CPU_LIMIT` and `CONTAINER_MEMORY_LIMIT` pass through to `docker run` as `--cpus` / `--memory` (`container-runner.ts`). Both empty by default — no flag added, spawn args byte-identical to today — so existing installs are unaffected. Set them to cap an agent container's CPU/memory so one agent can't monopolize the host (e.g. `CONTAINER_CPU_LIMIT=2`, `CONTAINER_MEMORY_LIMIT=8g`). Swap is intentionally not managed here: `--memory` is a hard cap on a swapless host.
diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md
index 742380bd8..e78dfe89c 100644
--- a/CLAUDE.md
+++ b/CLAUDE.md
@@ -62,11 +62,12 @@ For ad-hoc queries from skills or scripts, use the in-tree wrapper rather than t
 | `src/index.ts` | Entry point: init DB, migrations, channel adapters, delivery polls, sweep, shutdown |
 | `src/router.ts` | Inbound routing: messaging group → agent group → session → `inbound.db` → wake |
 | `src/delivery.ts` | Polls `outbound.db`, delivers via adapter, handles system actions (schedule, approvals, etc.) |
+| `src/delivery-guard.ts` | `DeliveryGuardSpec` + `runGuarded` — the precheck → guard → deny/hold/allow consult path for privileged delivery actions; the registry itself stays in `delivery.ts` |
 | `src/host-sweep.ts` | 60s sweep: `processing_ack` sync, stale detection, due-message wake, recurrence |
 | `src/session-manager.ts` | Resolves sessions; opens `inbound.db` / `outbound.db`; manages heartbeat path |
 | `src/container-runner.ts` | Spawns per-agent-group Docker containers with session DB + outbox mounts, OneCLI `ensureAgent` |
 | `src/container-runtime.ts` | Docker CLI wrapper (runtime binary, host-gateway args, mount args), orphan cleanup |
-| `src/guard/` | Privileged-action decision seam: `guard(action, input)` → allow \| hold \| deny. Domain-free leaf; domain baselines are `defineGuardedAction` values exported from module-edge `guard.ts` adapters (cli, agent-to-agent, self-mod, permissions) — consults hold the value, so a missing/typo'd wiring is a compile error, never a fail-open. The keyed registries (ncl commands, delivery actions) demand a guard at registration (derived spec or explicit `unguarded(<reason>)`); broadcast hooks (response handlers, message interceptors) consult the guard inline where privileged. Approved replays carry the approval row as a grant and re-check the structural baseline. Boot check = grant continuations only (`src/guard-conformance.ts`); Policy-as-data is deferred to guarded-actions phase 3. Conformance test: `src/guard/conformance.test.ts` |
+| `src/guard/` | Privileged-action decision seam: `guard(action, input)` → allow \| hold \| deny. Domain-free leaf; domain decisions are `defineGuardedAction` values exported from module-edge `guard.ts` adapters (cli, agent-to-agent, self-mod, permissions) — consults hold the value, so a missing/typo'd wiring is a compile error, never a fail-open. The keyed registries (ncl commands, delivery actions) demand a guard at registration (derived spec or explicit `unguarded(<reason>)`); broadcast hooks (response handlers, message interceptors) consult the guard inline where privileged. Approved replays carry the approval row as a grant and re-run the structural checks. Policy-as-data is deferred to guarded-actions phase 3. Conformance test: `src/guard/conformance.test.ts` |
 | `src/modules/permissions/access.ts` | `canAccessAgentGroup` — owner / global admin / scoped admin / member resolution against `user_roles` + `agent_group_members` |
 | `src/modules/approvals/primitive.ts` | `pickApprover`, `pickApprovalDelivery`, `requestApproval`, approval-handler registry |
 | `src/command-gate.ts` | Router-side admin command gate — queries `user_roles` directly (no env var, no container-side check) |
diff --git a/src/cli/dispatch.ts b/src/cli/dispatch.ts
index bb44144d1..fc198354b 100644
--- a/src/cli/dispatch.ts
+++ b/src/cli/dispatch.ts
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
  * auto-fill, the sessions-get existence oracle, `--help` interception,
  * parseArgs, and post-handler row filtering. An approved replay re-enters
  * here carrying the verified approval row as its grant — the guard re-checks
- * the structural baseline live, and the `approved: true` boolean no longer
+ * the structural checks live, and the `approved: true` boolean no longer
  * exists.
  */
 import { getContainerConfig } from '../db/container-configs.js';
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ export async function dispatch(
   }
 
   // Group-scope mechanics for agent callers (visibility, not policy — the
-  // allow/hold/deny decisions live in the guard baseline, cli/guard.ts).
+  // allow/hold/deny decisions live in the guard decision, cli/guard.ts).
   if (ctx.caller === 'agent') {
     const configRow = getContainerConfig(ctx.agentGroupId);
     const cliScope = configRow?.cli_scope ?? 'group';
diff --git a/src/cli/guard.ts b/src/cli/guard.ts
index 2b7ebca39..68fbaa3db 100644
--- a/src/cli/guard.ts
+++ b/src/cli/guard.ts
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 /**
  * CLI guard adapter — the command registry's catalog derivation and
- * structural baseline, moved verbatim out of dispatch.ts (guarded-actions
+ * structural decision, moved verbatim out of dispatch.ts (guarded-actions
  * phase 2). Declaration is registration: registry.register() derives one
  * catalog entry per command from the CommandDef itself; no second file is
  * edited when a command is added.
  *
- * The baseline carries today's decisions exactly:
+ * The decide fn carries today's decisions exactly:
  *   host caller → allow (the 0600 socket is the auth story — in code,
  *   unremovable by data);
  *   cli_scope 'disabled' → deny; 'group' → resource allowlist, cross-group
@@ -28,9 +28,9 @@ export function commandGuardAction(cmd: Pick<CommandDef, 'name' | 'action'>): st
 export function commandGuardSpec(cmd: CommandDef): GuardedActionSpec {
   return {
     action: commandGuardAction(cmd),
-    approvalAction: cmd.access === 'approval' ? 'cli_command' : undefined,
+    grantActionName: cmd.access === 'approval' ? 'cli_command' : undefined,
     // Bind a cli_command grant to the exact command it was approved for.
-    grantMatches: (grant) => {
+    grantCoversRequest: (grant) => {
       try {
         const payload = JSON.parse(grant.payload) as { frame?: { command?: string } };
         return payload.frame?.command === cmd.name;
@@ -38,11 +38,11 @@ export function commandGuardSpec(cmd: CommandDef): GuardedActionSpec {
         return false;
       }
     },
-    baseline: (input) => commandBaseline(cmd, input),
+    decide: (input) => commandDecide(cmd, input),
   };
 }
 
-function commandBaseline(cmd: CommandDef, input: GuardInput) {
+function commandDecide(cmd: CommandDef, input: GuardInput) {
   const { actor } = input;
   if (actor.kind === 'host') return ALLOW('host caller (trusted socket)');
   if (actor.kind !== 'agent') return DENY('CLI commands accept host or agent callers only.');
diff --git a/src/delivery-actions.test.ts b/src/delivery-actions.test.ts
index fc38d769a..6bd06fc90 100644
--- a/src/delivery-actions.test.ts
+++ b/src/delivery-actions.test.ts
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ describe('delivery action registry', () => {
   it('refuses to replace a guard-wrapped action with an unguarded handler', () => {
     const guardAction = defineGuardedAction({
       action: 'test.guarded-overwrite',
-      baseline: () => HOLD('t'),
+      decide: () => HOLD('t'),
     });
     registerDeliveryAction('test_guarded_overwrite', async () => {}, {
       guardAction,
diff --git a/src/delivery-guard.ts b/src/delivery-guard.ts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e4a99d725
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/delivery-guard.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/**
+ * The guard-consult path for privileged delivery actions.
+ *
+ * The registry itself — registration, lookup, approved-replay re-entry —
+ * stays in delivery.ts, close to main's shape. This file holds the new
+ * guard logic: the spec a privileged registration carries, and runGuarded,
+ * the precheck → guard → deny/hold/allow pipeline every consult runs.
+ */
+import { guard, type GuardedAction } from './guard/index.js';
+import { log } from './log.js';
+import type { PendingApproval, Session } from './types.js';
+
+/** Handler shape for guard-wrapped actions — must not touch inDb (replays run without one). */
+export type GuardedDeliveryHandler = (content: Record<string, unknown>, session: Session) => Promise<void>;
+
+export interface DeliveryGuardSpec {
+  /** Guard action consulted before the handler runs — the defined value, not a name. */
+  guardAction: GuardedAction;
+  /**
+   * Domain validation that runs before the guard — malformed requests are
+   * answered (notify) without ever creating a hold. Return false to stop.
+   */
+  precheck?: (content: Record<string, unknown>, session: Session) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;
+  /** Create the hold (the domain's requestApproval call — card text lives with the domain). */
+  requestHold: (content: Record<string, unknown>, session: Session) => Promise<void>;
+  /** Tell the requester about a deny. */
+  onDeny?: (content: Record<string, unknown>, session: Session, reason: string) => void;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Run a guarded delivery action: precheck, consult the guard, then route the
+ * decision — deny → onDeny, hold → requestHold, allow → handler. A fresh
+ * dispatch passes grant=null; an approved replay passes the approval row,
+ * which satisfies a hold but never a deny (the structural checks re-run
+ * live, so approve-then-revoke does not execute).
+ */
+export async function runGuarded(
+  action: string,
+  spec: DeliveryGuardSpec,
+  handler: GuardedDeliveryHandler,
+  content: Record<string, unknown>,
+  session: Session,
+  grant: PendingApproval | null,
+): Promise<void> {
+  if (spec.precheck && !(await spec.precheck(content, session))) return;
+
+  const decision = guard(spec.guardAction, {
+    actor: { kind: 'agent', agentGroupId: session.agent_group_id, sessionId: session.id },
+    payload: content,
+    grant,
+  });
+
+  if (decision.effect === 'deny') {
+    log.warn('Delivery action denied by guard', { action, reason: decision.reason });
+    spec.onDeny?.(content, session, decision.reason);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (decision.effect === 'hold') {
+    await spec.requestHold(content, session);
+    return;
+  }
+  await handler(content, session);
+}
diff --git a/src/delivery.ts b/src/delivery.ts
index 311c99567..4ff8a9354 100644
--- a/src/delivery.ts
+++ b/src/delivery.ts
@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ import {
   markDeliveryFailed,
   migrateDeliveredTable,
 } from './db/session-db.js';
-import { guard, isUnguarded, type GuardedAction, type Unguarded } from './guard/index.js';
+import { runGuarded, type DeliveryGuardSpec, type GuardedDeliveryHandler } from './delivery-guard.js';
+import { isUnguarded, type Unguarded } from './guard/index.js';
 import { log } from './log.js';
 import { normalizeOptions } from './channels/ask-question.js';
 import { clearOutbox, openInboundDb, openOutboundDb, readOutboxFiles } from './session-manager.js';
@@ -401,8 +402,8 @@ async function deliverMessage(
  * — dispatch, approved replay, test lookup — goes through the guard consult
  * (allow / hold / deny), so there is no unguarded route to it. On approve,
  * the continuation re-enters the same entry carrying the approval row as its
- * grant (`reenterGuardedDeliveryAction`), so the structural baseline is
- * re-checked live. Plain actions (the cli_request bridge — its inner
+ * grant (`reenterGuardedDeliveryAction`), so the structural checks are
+ * re-run live. Plain actions (the cli_request bridge — its inner
  * commands are guarded at dispatch) register with an
  * explicit `unguarded(<reason>)` declaration instead of a spec — omission is
  * not representable, so the decision to run unguarded is visible, and
@@ -414,23 +415,6 @@ export type DeliveryActionHandler = (
   inDb: Database.Database,
 ) => Promise<void>;
 
-/** Handler shape for guard-wrapped actions — must not touch inDb (replays run without one). */
-export type GuardedDeliveryHandler = (content: Record<string, unknown>, session: Session) => Promise<void>;
-
-export interface DeliveryGuardSpec {
-  /** Guard action consulted before the handler runs — the defined value, not a name. */
-  guardAction: GuardedAction;
-  /**
-   * Domain validation that runs before the guard — malformed requests are
-   * answered (notify) without ever creating a hold. Return false to stop.
-   */
-  precheck?: (content: Record<string, unknown>, session: Session) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;
-  /** Create the hold (the domain's requestApproval call — card text lives with the domain). */
-  requestHold: (content: Record<string, unknown>, session: Session) => Promise<void>;
-  /** Tell the requester about a deny. */
-  onDeny?: (content: Record<string, unknown>, session: Session, reason: string) => void;
-}
-
 type DeliveryEntry =
   | { guard: Unguarded; handler: DeliveryActionHandler }
   | { guard: DeliveryGuardSpec; handler: GuardedDeliveryHandler };
@@ -467,38 +451,10 @@ export function registerDeliveryAction(
   deliveryActions.set(action, { guard: guardDecl, handler } as DeliveryEntry);
 }
 
-async function runGuarded(
-  action: string,
-  entry: Extract<DeliveryEntry, { guard: DeliveryGuardSpec }>,
-  content: Record<string, unknown>,
-  session: Session,
-  grant: PendingApproval | null,
-): Promise<void> {
-  const spec = entry.guard;
-  if (spec.precheck && !(await spec.precheck(content, session))) return;
-
-  const decision = guard(spec.guardAction, {
-    actor: { kind: 'agent', agentGroupId: session.agent_group_id, sessionId: session.id },
-    payload: content,
-    grant,
-  });
-
-  if (decision.effect === 'deny') {
-    log.warn('Delivery action denied by guard', { action, reason: decision.reason });
-    spec.onDeny?.(content, session, decision.reason);
-    return;
-  }
-  if (decision.effect === 'hold') {
-    await spec.requestHold(content, session);
-    return;
-  }
-  await entry.handler(content, session);
-}
-
 /**
  * Approve continuation for a guard-wrapped delivery action: re-enter the
  * entry with the approval row as the grant. The guard treats the grant as
- * hold-satisfied but re-runs the structural baseline, so approve-then-revoke
+ * hold-satisfied but re-runs the structural checks, so approve-then-revoke
  * does not execute. Domains register this as their approval handler in the
  * same line that registers the action.
  */
@@ -509,7 +465,7 @@ export function reenterGuardedDeliveryAction(action: string) {
       log.warn('Approved replay for an action that is not guard-wrapped — dropping', { action });
       return;
     }
-    await runGuarded(action, entry, ctx.payload, ctx.session, ctx.approval);
+    await runGuarded(action, entry.guard, entry.handler, ctx.payload, ctx.session, ctx.approval);
   };
 }
 
@@ -522,7 +478,7 @@ export function getDeliveryAction(action: string): DeliveryActionHandler | undef
   const entry = deliveryActions.get(action);
   if (!entry) return undefined;
   if (isUnguardedEntry(entry)) return entry.handler;
-  return (content, session) => runGuarded(action, entry, content, session, null);
+  return (content, session) => runGuarded(action, entry.guard, entry.handler, content, session, null);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/src/guard-conformance.ts b/src/guard-conformance.ts
deleted file mode 100644
index 904563f79..000000000
--- a/src/guard-conformance.ts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Boot-time guard sanity — the one cross-registry invariant left to check
- * after all import-time registrations have run.
- *
- * The old registry walk is gone: everything it detected is now
- * unconstructible at the API level.
- *   - A consult site cannot name a missing catalog entry — guard() takes the
- *     GuardedAction VALUE returned by defineGuardedAction, so a dropped
- *     module-edge import or a typo'd action is a compile error (and a forged
- *     value is denied at runtime), not a silent allow.
- *   - A privileged handler cannot register unguarded by omission — the
- *     delivery-action registry requires a guard spec or an explicit
- *     unguarded(<reason>) declaration, and every ncl command derives its
- *     guard inside register().
- *
- * What remains is completeness ACROSS registries: a guarded action that
- * holds via `approvalAction` needs a registered approval handler, or an
- * approved card resolves into nothing — the hold has no continuation. That
- * pairing only exists once every module has loaded (catalog entries and
- * approval handlers register from different modules), so it stays a boot
- * check with the fail-closed posture: the host refuses to start, surfacing
- * the mis-composition at skill-install time instead of at the first
- * approved card.
- */
-import { listGuardedActions } from './guard/index.js';
-import { log } from './log.js';
-import { getApprovalHandler } from './modules/approvals/primitive.js';
-
-/** Holding actions with no approve continuation. Empty = conformant. */
-export function grantContinuationGaps(): string[] {
-  return listGuardedActions()
-    .filter((spec) => spec.approvalAction && !getApprovalHandler(spec.approvalAction))
-    .map(
-      (spec) =>
-        `guarded action "${spec.action}" holds via approval action "${spec.approvalAction}" ` +
-        'but no approval handler is registered — an approved hold would have no continuation',
-    );
-}
-
-/**
- * Boot check: refuse to start when a holding action has no continuation.
- * Call after all import-time registrations (any point in main()).
- */
-export function enforceGuardConformance(): void {
-  const gaps = grantContinuationGaps();
-  if (gaps.length === 0) return;
-
-  console.error(
-    [
-      '',
-      '='.repeat(64),
-      'NanoClaw stopped: guard conformance failure',
-      '='.repeat(64),
-      'A guarded action can hold for approval, but no approval handler is',
-      'registered for its approval action — an admin could click Approve',
-      'and nothing would execute. This usually means a module (or skill)',
-      'defined a holding baseline without registering its continuation.',
-      '',
-      ...gaps.map((g) => `  - ${g}`),
-      '',
-      'Register the approval handler (registerApprovalHandler) in the same',
-      'module that defines the guarded action, or drop approvalAction from',
-      'the definition if the action can never hold.',
-      '='.repeat(64),
-      '',
-    ].join('\n'),
-  );
-  log.error('Guard conformance failure — refusing to start', { gaps });
-  process.exit(1);
-}
diff --git a/src/guard/conformance.test.ts b/src/guard/conformance.test.ts
index a1621841c..086f0a40d 100644
--- a/src/guard/conformance.test.ts
+++ b/src/guard/conformance.test.ts
@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
 /**
- * Guard conformance — the boot invariant, checked with the real registries.
+ * Guard conformance — checked with the real registries.
  *
  * The old registry walk is gone: an unmapped consult or an undeclared
  * unguarded registration is now unconstructible — guard() takes the defined
  * GuardedAction value (a dropped module-edge import or typo'd name is a
- * compile error), and every registry requires a guard spec or an explicit
- * unguarded(<reason>) declaration. What's left to verify structurally is the
+ * compile error), and the keyed registries require a guard spec or an
+ * explicit unguarded(<reason>) declaration. What's left to verify is the
  * cross-registry pairing the compiler can't see: every holding action has a
- * registered approve continuation. The check runs here in CI and at every
- * boot (enforceGuardConformance refuses to start) — CI can't see
- * skill-installed registrations, the boot check can.
+ * registered approve continuation. (At runtime a missing continuation is
+ * handled loudly at click time — the requester is told no handler is
+ * installed; this test keeps the tree from shipping that state.)
  */
 import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
 
@@ -20,21 +20,16 @@ import '../cli/delivery-action.js';
 import '../cli/dispatch.js'; // registers the cli_command approval handler
 
 import { commandGuard, listCommands } from '../cli/registry.js';
-import { grantContinuationGaps } from '../guard-conformance.js';
 import { getApprovalHandler } from '../modules/approvals/primitive.js';
 import { defineGuardedAction, listGuardedActions } from './guard-actions.js';
 import { HOLD } from './types.js';
 
 describe('guard conformance', () => {
-  it('the grant-continuation check (shared with the boot check) reports zero gaps', () => {
-    expect(grantContinuationGaps()).toEqual([]);
-  });
-
   it('every holding action pairs with a registered approval handler', () => {
-    const holding = listGuardedActions().filter((spec) => spec.approvalAction);
+    const holding = listGuardedActions().filter((spec) => spec.grantActionName);
     expect(holding.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
 
-    const dangling = holding.filter((spec) => !getApprovalHandler(spec.approvalAction as string));
+    const dangling = holding.filter((spec) => !getApprovalHandler(spec.grantActionName as string));
     expect(dangling.map((s) => s.action)).toEqual([]);
   });
 
@@ -42,7 +37,7 @@ describe('guard conformance', () => {
     const mutating = listCommands().filter((cmd) => cmd.access === 'approval');
     expect(mutating.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
 
-    const wrong = mutating.filter((cmd) => commandGuard(cmd.name).approvalAction !== 'cli_command');
+    const wrong = mutating.filter((cmd) => commandGuard(cmd.name).grantActionName !== 'cli_command');
     expect(wrong.map((c) => c.name)).toEqual([]);
   });
 
@@ -61,24 +56,9 @@ describe('guard conformance', () => {
   });
 
   it('defining the same action twice throws — names are the catalog key', () => {
-    defineGuardedAction({ action: 'test.dup-define', baseline: () => HOLD('x') });
-    expect(() => defineGuardedAction({ action: 'test.dup-define', baseline: () => HOLD('x') })).toThrow(
+    defineGuardedAction({ action: 'test.dup-define', decide: () => HOLD('x') });
+    expect(() => defineGuardedAction({ action: 'test.dup-define', decide: () => HOLD('x') })).toThrow(
       /already defined/,
     );
   });
-
-  // KEEP LAST: defines a holding action with no continuation into the shared
-  // per-worker catalog, so every gap check after this point sees it.
-  it('the check names a holding action with no approve continuation (what boot refuses on)', () => {
-    defineGuardedAction({
-      action: 'test.dangling-hold',
-      approvalAction: 'test_dangling_hold_approved',
-      baseline: () => HOLD('always'),
-    });
-
-    const gaps = grantContinuationGaps();
-    expect(gaps).toHaveLength(1);
-    expect(gaps[0]).toContain('test.dangling-hold');
-    expect(gaps[0]).toContain('no approval handler');
-  });
 });
diff --git a/src/guard/guard-actions.ts b/src/guard/guard-actions.ts
index 85f4e6cc3..09f139a3e 100644
--- a/src/guard/guard-actions.ts
+++ b/src/guard/guard-actions.ts
@@ -4,14 +4,14 @@
  * An action either is defined here (and every consult passes its decision)
  * or cannot be consulted at all: guard() takes the GuardedAction VALUE
  * returned by defineGuardedAction, so the wiring between a consult site and
- * its baseline is a symbol reference the compiler checks. A dropped
+ * its decide fn is a symbol reference the compiler checks. A dropped
  * module-edge import or a typo'd action name is a build error, not a
  * runtime fail-open — there is no lookup that can miss.
  *
- * Definitions are still recorded by name so boot can enumerate them: the
- * grant-continuation check (src/guard-conformance.ts) pairs every holding
- * action with its registered approval handler, and duplicate names are
- * refused at definition time (grants match on the name).
+ * Definitions are still recorded by name so the catalog can be enumerated:
+ * the conformance test pairs every holding action with its registered
+ * approval handler, and duplicate names are refused at definition time
+ * (grants match on the name).
  */
 import type { GuardDecision, GuardInput } from './types.js';
 import type { PendingApproval } from '../types.js';
@@ -24,25 +24,25 @@ export interface GuardedActionSpec {
    * allow. Runs on every consult, including approved replays (a grant
    * satisfies a hold, never a deny).
    */
-  baseline: (input: GuardInput) => GuardDecision;
+  decide: (input: GuardInput) => GuardDecision;
   /**
    * The pending_approvals.action its holds resolve through — a grant is only
    * accepted when its row carries this action. Omit for actions that can
-   * never be held (deny/allow-only baselines).
+   * never be held (deny/allow-only decisions).
    */
-  approvalAction?: string;
+  grantActionName?: string;
   /**
    * Extra domain binding between a grant and the replayed input (e.g. the
    * a2a target must match the held message). Runs in addition to the
-   * approvalAction + live-row checks.
+   * grantActionName + live-row checks.
    */
-  grantMatches?: (grant: PendingApproval, input: GuardInput) => boolean;
+  grantCoversRequest?: (grant: PendingApproval, input: GuardInput) => boolean;
 }
 
 declare const guardedActionBrand: unique symbol;
 /**
  * A defined guarded action — only defineGuardedAction can mint one. The
- * brand makes the type nominal: a hand-rolled { action, baseline } object
+ * brand makes the type nominal: a hand-rolled { action, decide } object
  * does not typecheck at a consult site, and fails the runtime check too.
  */
 export type GuardedAction = Readonly<GuardedActionSpec> & { readonly [guardedActionBrand]: true };
diff --git a/src/guard/guard.test.ts b/src/guard/guard.test.ts
index db2a76e79..11b3f9090 100644
--- a/src/guard/guard.test.ts
+++ b/src/guard/guard.test.ts
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 /**
- * Guard decision-function unit tests: the baseline is the decision (allow /
+ * Guard decision-function unit tests: decide is the decision (allow /
  * hold / deny returned as-is), grant semantics (satisfies holds, never
  * denies; invalid → refuse), the runtime backstop against forged action
- * values, and the fail-closed posture on a throwing baseline.
+ * values, and the fail-closed posture on a throwing decide.
  *
  * Uses synthetic actions defined per test — the catalog is per-worker module
  * state with no reset, so action names are unique.
@@ -35,14 +35,14 @@ afterEach(() => {
   vi.clearAllMocks();
 });
 
-describe('the baseline is the decision', () => {
-  it('baseline allow → allow', () => {
-    const action = defineGuardedAction({ action: 't.allow1', baseline: () => ALLOW('ok') });
+describe('decide is the decision', () => {
+  it('decide allow → allow', () => {
+    const action = defineGuardedAction({ action: 't.allow1', decide: () => ALLOW('ok') });
     expect(guard(action, input()).effect).toBe('allow');
   });
 
-  it('baseline hold → hold, default approver chain', () => {
-    const action = defineGuardedAction({ action: 't.hold1', baseline: () => HOLD('needs approval') });
+  it('decide hold → hold, default approver chain', () => {
+    const action = defineGuardedAction({ action: 't.hold1', decide: () => HOLD('needs approval') });
     const d = guard(action, input());
     expect(d.effect).toBe('hold');
     if (d.effect === 'hold') {
@@ -51,22 +51,22 @@ describe('the baseline is the decision', () => {
     }
   });
 
-  it('baseline hold → hold, carrying a named approver', () => {
-    const action = defineGuardedAction({ action: 't.hold2', baseline: () => HOLD('policy row', 'telegram:dana') });
+  it('decide hold → hold, carrying a named approver', () => {
+    const action = defineGuardedAction({ action: 't.hold2', decide: () => HOLD('policy row', 'telegram:dana') });
     const d = guard(action, input());
     expect(d.effect).toBe('hold');
     if (d.effect === 'hold') expect(d.approverUserId).toBe('telegram:dana');
   });
 
-  it('baseline deny → deny, carrying the reason', () => {
-    const action = defineGuardedAction({ action: 't.deny1', baseline: () => DENY('structurally unauthorized') });
+  it('decide deny → deny, carrying the reason', () => {
+    const action = defineGuardedAction({ action: 't.deny1', decide: () => DENY('structurally unauthorized') });
     const d = guard(action, input());
     expect(d.effect).toBe('deny');
     if (d.effect === 'deny') expect(d.reason).toBe('structurally unauthorized');
   });
 
   it('a forged action value (not from defineGuardedAction) is denied', () => {
-    const forged = { action: 't.forged', baseline: () => ALLOW('never vetted') } as unknown as GuardedAction;
+    const forged = { action: 't.forged', decide: () => ALLOW('never vetted') } as unknown as GuardedAction;
     const d = guard(forged, input());
     expect(d.effect).toBe('deny');
     if (d.effect === 'deny') expect(d.reason).toContain('undefined action');
@@ -80,19 +80,19 @@ describe('grants', () => {
   it('a valid live grant satisfies a hold', () => {
     const action = defineGuardedAction({
       action: 't.g1',
-      approvalAction: 'g1_approved',
-      baseline: () => HOLD('b'),
+      grantActionName: 'g1_approved',
+      decide: () => HOLD('b'),
     });
     const grant = grantRow('g1_approved');
     mockGetPendingApproval.mockReturnValue(grant);
     expect(guard(action, input({ grant })).effect).toBe('allow');
   });
 
-  it('a grant never satisfies a deny — the baseline is re-checked live', () => {
+  it('a grant never satisfies a deny — the checks re-run live', () => {
     const action = defineGuardedAction({
       action: 't.g2',
-      approvalAction: 'g2_approved',
-      baseline: () => DENY('revoked since'),
+      grantActionName: 'g2_approved',
+      decide: () => DENY('revoked since'),
     });
     const grant = grantRow('g2_approved');
     mockGetPendingApproval.mockReturnValue(grant);
@@ -104,8 +104,8 @@ describe('grants', () => {
   it('a dead grant (row deleted) refuses instead of re-holding', () => {
     const action = defineGuardedAction({
       action: 't.g3',
-      approvalAction: 'g3_approved',
-      baseline: () => HOLD('b'),
+      grantActionName: 'g3_approved',
+      decide: () => HOLD('b'),
     });
     mockGetPendingApproval.mockReturnValue(undefined);
     const d = guard(action, input({ grant: grantRow('g3_approved') }));
@@ -115,20 +115,20 @@ describe('grants', () => {
   it("a grant for a different action doesn't transfer", () => {
     const action = defineGuardedAction({
       action: 't.g4',
-      approvalAction: 'g4_approved',
-      baseline: () => HOLD('b'),
+      grantActionName: 'g4_approved',
+      decide: () => HOLD('b'),
     });
     const grant = grantRow('other_action');
     mockGetPendingApproval.mockReturnValue(grant);
     expect(guard(action, input({ grant })).effect).toBe('deny');
   });
 
-  it('a domain grantMatches binding can refuse a payload mismatch', () => {
+  it('a domain grantCoversRequest binding can refuse a payload mismatch', () => {
     const action = defineGuardedAction({
       action: 't.g5',
-      approvalAction: 'g5_approved',
-      grantMatches: () => false,
-      baseline: () => HOLD('b'),
+      grantActionName: 'g5_approved',
+      grantCoversRequest: () => false,
+      decide: () => HOLD('b'),
     });
     const grant = grantRow('g5_approved');
     mockGetPendingApproval.mockReturnValue(grant);
@@ -138,8 +138,8 @@ describe('grants', () => {
   it('a grant on an already-allowed action is a no-op', () => {
     const action = defineGuardedAction({
       action: 't.g6',
-      approvalAction: 'g6_approved',
-      baseline: () => ALLOW('ok'),
+      grantActionName: 'g6_approved',
+      decide: () => ALLOW('ok'),
     });
     const grant = grantRow('g6_approved');
     mockGetPendingApproval.mockReturnValue(grant);
@@ -148,10 +148,10 @@ describe('grants', () => {
 });
 
 describe('fail-closed posture', () => {
-  it('a throwing baseline denies', () => {
+  it('a throwing decide denies', () => {
     const action = defineGuardedAction({
       action: 't.f1',
-      baseline: () => {
+      decide: () => {
         throw new Error('boom');
       },
     });
diff --git a/src/guard/guard.ts b/src/guard/guard.ts
index 56008a212..a73a056d8 100644
--- a/src/guard/guard.ts
+++ b/src/guard/guard.ts
@@ -1,25 +1,25 @@
 /**
  * guard() — the one decision function every privileged action consults.
  *
- * The decision is the action's structural baseline — today's code checks,
+ * The decision is the action's decide fn — today's code checks,
  * defined per action at the module edges. The consult site holds the
  * GuardedAction value itself (defineGuardedAction), so there is no name
  * lookup and no fail-open path for an unknown action: an unwired consult is
  * a compile error, and a value that didn't come from defineGuardedAction is
  * denied at runtime. Policy-as-data (tighten-only rule sources composing
- * with the baseline) is deliberately deferred to phase 3 of the
+ * with the decision) is deliberately deferred to phase 3 of the
  * guarded-actions design, where the generalized rules table arrives with its
  * first operator-visible consumer; until then the one policy table
- * (agent_message_policies) is consulted inside the a2a.send baseline.
+ * (agent_message_policies) is consulted inside a2a.send's decide.
  *
  * Grants: an approved replay carries the verified approval row. A valid
  * grant (live pending row whose action matches the entry's approval action,
  * plus any domain binding) satisfies a hold — the human already decided —
- * but NEVER a deny: the baseline is re-checked live, so approve-then-revoke
+ * but NEVER a deny: the checks re-run live, so approve-then-revoke
  * no longer executes. A grant that is present but invalid fails closed to
  * deny (no second card).
  *
- * The guard itself fails closed: a throwing baseline denies.
+ * The guard itself fails closed: a throwing decide denies.
  */
 import { getPendingApproval } from '../db/sessions.js';
 import { log } from '../log.js';
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ import { ALLOW, DENY, type GuardDecision, type GuardInput } from './types.js';
 export function guard(action: GuardedAction, input: GuardInput): GuardDecision {
   if (!isGuardedAction(action)) {
     // JS-level backstop — the branded type already forbids this. A
-    // hand-rolled object must not carry a baseline never vetted at
+    // hand-rolled object must not carry a decide fn never vetted at
     // definition time.
     log.error('Guard consulted with an undefined action — failing closed', {
       action: (action as { action?: unknown } | null)?.action,
@@ -39,14 +39,14 @@ export function guard(action: GuardedAction, input: GuardInput): GuardDecision {
 
   let decision: GuardDecision;
   try {
-    decision = action.baseline(input);
+    decision = action.decide(input);
   } catch (err) {
     log.error('Guard evaluation threw — failing closed', { action: action.action, err });
     return DENY('guard failure (failing closed)');
   }
 
   if (!input.grant || decision.effect !== 'hold') {
-    // A grant never loosens a deny (the baseline re-check is live), and a
+    // A grant never loosens a deny (the checks re-run live), and a
     // grant on an already-allowed action is a no-op.
     return decision;
   }
@@ -61,12 +61,12 @@ export function guard(action: GuardedAction, input: GuardInput): GuardDecision {
 
 function grantSatisfies(action: GuardedAction, input: GuardInput): boolean {
   const grant = input.grant;
-  if (!grant || !action.approvalAction) return false;
-  if (grant.action !== action.approvalAction) return false;
+  if (!grant || !action.grantActionName) return false;
+  if (grant.action !== action.grantActionName) return false;
   // The row must still be live — resolution deletes it, so a grant can only
   // execute once and a fabricated row object doesn't pass.
   const live = getPendingApproval(grant.approval_id);
-  if (!live || live.action !== action.approvalAction) return false;
-  if (action.grantMatches && !action.grantMatches(grant, input)) return false;
+  if (!live || live.action !== action.grantActionName) return false;
+  if (action.grantCoversRequest && !action.grantCoversRequest(grant, input)) return false;
   return true;
 }
diff --git a/src/guard/index.ts b/src/guard/index.ts
index 891c3a72a..488037066 100644
--- a/src/guard/index.ts
+++ b/src/guard/index.ts
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
  * (guard-actions.ts). Consults carry the GuardedAction value returned by
  * defineGuardedAction — never a name to look up — so mis-wiring is a build
  * error, not a runtime fail-open.
- * Domain-free leaf: domain baselines are defined at the domain modules' edges.
+ * Domain-free leaf: domain decisions are defined at the domain modules' edges.
  */
 export { guard } from './guard.js';
 export {
diff --git a/src/guard/types.ts b/src/guard/types.ts
index 4e03b643b..2aca34872 100644
--- a/src/guard/types.ts
+++ b/src/guard/types.ts
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  *
  * The guard is a domain-free leaf: this module may import the DB read layer,
  * config, log, and shared types — never src/cli/* or src/modules/*. Domain
- * knowledge (what an action's structural baseline checks) arrives via
+ * knowledge (what an action's decide fn checks) arrives via
  * definition: domain modules call defineGuardedAction (guard-actions.ts) at
  * their module edges and pass the returned value to every consult and
  * registration site — the wiring is a symbol reference the compiler checks.
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ export interface GuardInput {
   /**
    * Verified approval row carried by an approved replay. A valid grant
    * satisfies a hold (the human already decided) but never a deny — the
-   * structural baseline is re-checked live on every replay.
+   * structural checks re-run live on every replay.
    */
   grant?: PendingApproval | null;
 }
diff --git a/src/index.ts b/src/index.ts
index 2ecf46d76..72887f32b 100644
--- a/src/index.ts
+++ b/src/index.ts
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import { initDb } from './db/connection.js';
 import { runMigrations } from './db/migrations/index.js';
 import { ensureContainerRuntimeRunning, cleanupOrphans } from './container-runtime.js';
 import { startActiveDeliveryPoll, startSweepDeliveryPoll, setDeliveryAdapter, stopDeliveryPolls } from './delivery.js';
-import { enforceGuardConformance } from './guard-conformance.js';
 import { startHostSweep, stopHostSweep } from './host-sweep.js';
 import { routeInbound } from './router.js';
 import { log } from './log.js';
@@ -70,12 +69,6 @@ async function main(): Promise<void> {
   // outside the sanctioned path (raw `git pull` instead of /update-nanoclaw).
   enforceUpgradeTripwire();
 
-  // 0.6 Guard conformance — every import-time registration has already run;
-  // refuse to start if any privileged command / delivery action is unmapped
-  // (CI can't see skill-installed code — this makes the invariant hold at
-  // the boundary where third-party registrations enter).
-  enforceGuardConformance();
-
   // 1. Init central DB
   const dbPath = path.join(DATA_DIR, 'v2.db');
   const db = initDb(dbPath);
diff --git a/src/modules/agent-to-agent/agent-route.ts b/src/modules/agent-to-agent/agent-route.ts
index 398baa832..66a9aa2a0 100644
--- a/src/modules/agent-to-agent/agent-route.ts
+++ b/src/modules/agent-to-agent/agent-route.ts
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ export async function routeAgentMessage(
     throw new Error(`agent-to-agent message ${msg.id} is missing a target agent group id`);
   }
 
-  // The a2a.send baseline (guard.ts) carries the checks verbatim in their
+  // The a2a.send decision (guard.ts) carries the checks verbatim in their
   // original order: destination ACL deny, target-exists deny, self-send
   // allow, agent_message_policies hold. An approved replay carries the
   // grant — the hold is satisfied but the structure is re-checked live, so
diff --git a/src/modules/agent-to-agent/create-agent.test.ts b/src/modules/agent-to-agent/create-agent.test.ts
index d67853e0b..96ebb920f 100644
--- a/src/modules/agent-to-agent/create-agent.test.ts
+++ b/src/modules/agent-to-agent/create-agent.test.ts
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  *
  * Regression guard for the audit finding: `create_agent` is a privileged
  * central-DB write with no host-side authz. Authorization is the guard's
- * `agents.create` baseline — trusted owner agent groups ('global') create
+ * `agents.create` decision — trusted owner agent groups ('global') create
  * directly; confined groups ('group', the default and the prompt-injection
  * victim) hold for admin approval. These tests drive the REAL wrapped
  * delivery action (the only reachable path) and the approve continuation's
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ describe('create_agent — guard-based authorization (wrapped delivery action)',
 });
 
 describe('create_agent — approved replay (grant-carrying re-entry)', () => {
-  it('valid grant executes exactly once — baseline hold is satisfied, create runs', async () => {
+  it('valid grant executes exactly once — decide hold is satisfied, create runs', async () => {
     mockGetContainerConfig.mockReturnValue({ cli_scope: 'group' });
     const payload = { name: 'Scout', instructions: 'help' };
     const approval = liveGrant('appr-ca-1', payload);
diff --git a/src/modules/agent-to-agent/create-agent.ts b/src/modules/agent-to-agent/create-agent.ts
index 312d1f30b..4f8e557c8 100644
--- a/src/modules/agent-to-agent/create-agent.ts
+++ b/src/modules/agent-to-agent/create-agent.ts
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
  * barred from. The container's MCP tool gate is inside the (untrusted)
  * container and is trivially bypassed by writing the outbound system row
  * directly, so authorization MUST be enforced host-side: the delivery
- * registry wraps this action with the guard, whose `agents.create` baseline
+ * registry wraps this action with the guard, whose `agents.create` decision
  * (./guard.ts) is the old cli_scope branch verbatim — trusted global-scope
  * groups allow, everything else (including unknown config, fail-closed)
  * holds for admin approval. On approve the continuation re-enters the
diff --git a/src/modules/agent-to-agent/guard.ts b/src/modules/agent-to-agent/guard.ts
index ce2cf9ab7..c778aa24f 100644
--- a/src/modules/agent-to-agent/guard.ts
+++ b/src/modules/agent-to-agent/guard.ts
@@ -32,16 +32,16 @@ export const A2A_MESSAGE_GATE_ACTION = 'a2a_message_gate';
 
 export const agentsCreate = defineGuardedAction({
   action: 'agents.create',
-  approvalAction: 'create_agent',
+  grantActionName: 'create_agent',
   // Bind a create_agent grant to the name that was approved.
-  grantMatches: (grant, input) => {
+  grantCoversRequest: (grant, input) => {
     try {
       return (JSON.parse(grant.payload) as { name?: string }).name === input.payload.name;
     } catch {
       return false;
     }
   },
-  baseline: (input) => {
+  decide: (input) => {
     if (input.actor.kind !== 'agent') return DENY('create_agent is a container-originated action.');
     const cliScope = getContainerConfig(input.actor.agentGroupId)?.cli_scope ?? 'group';
     if (cliScope === 'global') {
@@ -58,16 +58,16 @@ export const agentsCreate = defineGuardedAction({
 
 export const a2aSend = defineGuardedAction({
   action: 'a2a.send',
-  approvalAction: A2A_MESSAGE_GATE_ACTION,
+  grantActionName: A2A_MESSAGE_GATE_ACTION,
   // Bind an a2a grant to the exact held message target.
-  grantMatches: (grant, input) => {
+  grantCoversRequest: (grant, input) => {
     try {
       return (JSON.parse(grant.payload) as { platform_id?: string }).platform_id === input.resource?.to;
     } catch {
       return false;
     }
   },
-  baseline: (input) => {
+  decide: (input) => {
     if (input.actor.kind !== 'agent') return DENY('agent-to-agent send requires an agent actor');
     const from = input.actor.agentGroupId;
     const to = input.resource?.to ?? '';
diff --git a/src/modules/agent-to-agent/index.ts b/src/modules/agent-to-agent/index.ts
index 2114acaca..0a79f77dc 100644
--- a/src/modules/agent-to-agent/index.ts
+++ b/src/modules/agent-to-agent/index.ts
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  *
  * Registers its guard-catalog entries (./guard.js) and one guard-wrapped
  * delivery action (`create_agent`) — `create_agent` writes central-DB state,
- * so the guard's agents.create baseline holds confined (non-global) groups
+ * so the guard's agents.create decision holds confined (non-global) groups
  * for admin approval while trusted global-scope groups create directly; the
  * approval handler re-enters the wrapped action carrying the approval row as
  * its grant. The sibling `channel_type === 'agent'` routing path is NOT a
diff --git a/src/modules/agent-to-agent/message-gate.ts b/src/modules/agent-to-agent/message-gate.ts
index b93a1a0cc..d7b217d25 100644
--- a/src/modules/agent-to-agent/message-gate.ts
+++ b/src/modules/agent-to-agent/message-gate.ts
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ export const applyA2aMessageGate: ApprovalHandler = async ({ session, payload, a
 
   // One replay semantics: re-enter the guarded route carrying the approval
   // row as the grant. The policy hold is satisfied, but the structural
-  // baseline runs live — un-wiring the pair between hold and approve now
+  // checks run live — un-wiring the pair between hold and approve now
   // blocks delivery (the throw surfaces via the response handler's
   // "approved, but applying it failed" notify).
   await routeAgentMessage(msg, session, { grant: approval });
diff --git a/src/modules/permissions/guard.ts b/src/modules/permissions/guard.ts
index 075d2bf2d..64f09f5c1 100644
--- a/src/modules/permissions/guard.ts
+++ b/src/modules/permissions/guard.ts
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
  * anyway), `request_approval` holds, `strict` denies. The hold is executed by
  * the caller through the module's own pending_sender_approvals flow (card,
  * in-flight dedup) — not the approvals primitive — so this entry has no
- * approvalAction: the approve continuation adds the member and replays
+ * grantActionName: the approve continuation adds the member and replays
  * routeInbound, which then passes the gate structurally via membership, no
  * grant needed.
  *
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ import { hasAdminPrivilege } from './db/user-roles.js';
 
 export const sendersAdmit = defineGuardedAction({
   action: 'senders.admit',
-  baseline: (input) => {
+  decide: (input) => {
     const policy = input.payload.policy;
     if (policy === 'public') return ALLOW('public messaging group');
     if (policy === 'request_approval') {
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ export const sendersAdmit = defineGuardedAction({
 
 export const channelsRegister = defineGuardedAction({
   action: 'channels.register',
-  baseline: (input) => {
+  decide: (input) => {
     if (input.actor.kind !== 'human') return DENY('channel registration resolves via human clicks/replies');
     const questionId = typeof input.payload.questionId === 'string' ? input.payload.questionId : '';
     const row = getPendingChannelApproval(questionId);
diff --git a/src/modules/permissions/index.ts b/src/modules/permissions/index.ts
index 15daec1f8..99d206a2e 100644
--- a/src/modules/permissions/index.ts
+++ b/src/modules/permissions/index.ts
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ function handleUnknownSender(
     agent_group_id: agentGroupId,
   };
 
-  // The admission decision is the guard's senders.admit baseline (./guard.ts)
+  // The admission decision is the guard's senders.admit decision (./guard.ts)
   // — unknown_sender_policy verbatim: strict → deny, request_approval → hold,
   // public → allow (short-circuited before the gate). Drop-recording and the
   // hold creation stay here.
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ async function handleChannelApprovalResponse(payload: ResponsePayload): Promise<
   const row = getPendingChannelApproval(payload.questionId);
   if (!row) return false;
 
-  // Click authorization is the guard's channels.register baseline (./guard.ts):
+  // Click authorization is the guard's channels.register decision (./guard.ts):
   // the delivered approver, or an admin of the pending row's anchor agent group.
   const clickerId = payload.userId
     ? payload.userId.includes(':')
diff --git a/src/modules/self-mod/apply.ts b/src/modules/self-mod/apply.ts
index f3d3bde58..6f5fa7a81 100644
--- a/src/modules/self-mod/apply.ts
+++ b/src/modules/self-mod/apply.ts
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  *
  * The delivery registry's guard wrapper runs these only on `allow` — which,
  * for self-mod, means an approved replay carrying a valid grant (the
- * baseline holds unconditionally from the container path; see ./guard.ts).
+ * decision holds unconditionally from the container path; see ./guard.ts).
  * Each body mutates the container config in the DB, rebuilds/kills the
  * container as needed, and writes an on_wake message so the fresh container
  * picks up where the old one left off.
diff --git a/src/modules/self-mod/guard.ts b/src/modules/self-mod/guard.ts
index 0b80bc7a7..bbdb3a11e 100644
--- a/src/modules/self-mod/guard.ts
+++ b/src/modules/self-mod/guard.ts
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * Self-mod guard adapter — the module's catalog entries, composed at the
  * module edge (imported by ./index.ts).
  *
- * The structural baseline is today's behavior verbatim: from the container
+ * The decision is today's behavior verbatim: from the container
  * path, self-modification is held unconditionally for the agent group's
  * admin chain. (The equivalent host-side mutations — `ncl groups config
  * add-package` etc. — are separate catalog actions derived from the command
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  */
 import { DENY, HOLD, defineGuardedAction, type GuardInput } from '../../guard/index.js';
 
-function selfModBaseline(label: string) {
+function selfModDecide(label: string) {
   return (input: GuardInput) => {
     if (input.actor.kind !== 'agent') {
       return DENY(`${label} is a container-originated action.`);
@@ -21,12 +21,12 @@ function selfModBaseline(label: string) {
 
 export const selfModInstallPackages = defineGuardedAction({
   action: 'self_mod.install_packages',
-  approvalAction: 'install_packages',
-  baseline: selfModBaseline('install_packages'),
+  grantActionName: 'install_packages',
+  decide: selfModDecide('install_packages'),
 });
 
 export const selfModAddMcpServer = defineGuardedAction({
   action: 'self_mod.add_mcp_server',
-  approvalAction: 'add_mcp_server',
-  baseline: selfModBaseline('add_mcp_server'),
+  grantActionName: 'add_mcp_server',
+  decide: selfModDecide('add_mcp_server'),
 });
diff --git a/src/modules/self-mod/index.ts b/src/modules/self-mod/index.ts
index 8cdbc30f7..bfdc08797 100644
--- a/src/modules/self-mod/index.ts
+++ b/src/modules/self-mod/index.ts
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
  *         by the next container start.
  *   - Two approval handlers that re-enter the wrapped actions with the
  *     approval row as the grant (one replay semantics — the guard re-checks
- *     the structural baseline live).
+ *     the structural checks live).
  *
  * Without this module: the MCP tools in the container still write outbound
  * system messages with these actions, but delivery logs "Unknown system