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Moshe Krupper
4ef7d7367c
The guard's weak point was the wiring: catalog entries registered by
side-effect import, consult sites naming them by string, a map miss
resolving to ALLOW, and a boot walk that could only see 2 of the 4
registries (response handlers and interceptors erased their specs into
closures). Dropping one unreferenced import silently disarmed
channel-registration click-auth.
Make the broken wiring unconstructible instead of detected:
- defineGuardedAction returns a branded GuardedAction value; guard(action,
input) takes the value, not a name. A dropped module-edge import or a
typo'd action is now a compile error; there is no lookup and no
fail-open branch. A forged value (outside TS) is denied at runtime.
- Every registry (delivery actions, response handlers, interceptors)
requires a guard spec or an explicit unguarded(<reason>) declaration at
the registration site — unguarded-by-omission is not representable, and
the justification travels with the registration (grep "unguarded(" for
the complete inventory). CLI commands derive their guard inside
register(), so a command cannot exist without one.
- guardConformanceViolations() and EXEMPT_DELIVERY_ACTIONS are gone. The
boot check shrinks to the one cross-registry invariant the compiler
can't see: every holding action has a registered approve continuation
(grantContinuationGaps), same fail-closed refuse-to-start posture.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>