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Author SHA1 Message Date
gavrielc 2c3300bde9 Merge pull request #1609 from qwibitai/fix/apple-container-proxy-bind
fix: require CREDENTIAL_PROXY_HOST for Apple Container networking
2026-04-03 12:31:50 +03:00
Gavriel Cohen c0b58bd7ae fix: require CREDENTIAL_PROXY_HOST for Apple Container networking
bridge100 only exists while containers run, but the credential proxy must
start before any container. Binding to the bridge IP fails with EADDRNOTAVAIL
on cold boot and first-time setup.

Fail immediately with a clear error pointing to /convert-to-apple-container,
which guides users through setting CREDENTIAL_PROXY_HOST and optionally
configuring a macOS firewall rule on untrusted networks.

Co-Authored-By: MrBlaise <3867275+MrBlaise@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: lbsnrs <47463+lbsnrs@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: spencer-whitman <28708638+spencer-whitman@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: lazure-ocean <43110733+lazure-ocean@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-03 12:29:13 +03:00
gavrielc e3e6ccdbd9 Merge pull request #1523 from qwibitai/apple-container-fixes
fix: Apple Container networking and .env mount
2026-03-29 00:08:46 +03:00
gavrielc 9fc60f6af2 security: bind credential proxy to bridge IP, not 0.0.0.0
Binding to 0.0.0.0 exposed the credential proxy (which holds API
keys/OAuth tokens) to the entire local network. Now binds to the
bridge interface IP (same as CONTAINER_HOST_GATEWAY) so only Apple
Container VMs can reach it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-29 00:02:32 +03:00
gavrielc 5c56d4564d fix: Apple Container networking and .env mount
- Detect host gateway via bridge100/bridge0 interface instead of
  hardcoded host.docker.internal (not available in Apple Container VMs)
- Bind credential proxy to 0.0.0.0 so VMs can reach it via bridge network
- Export PROXY_BIND_HOST for credential proxy to use
- Remove /dev/null .env shadow mount — Apple Container only supports
  directory mounts; entrypoint handles .env shadowing via mount --bind

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 23:59:11 +03:00
gavrielc d0a61c6f57 merge: catch up with upstream main
Picks up main's changes while preserving Apple Container runtime:
- Built-in logger replacing pino/pino-pretty
- Removed unused deps (yaml, zod, @vitest/coverage-v8)
- stopContainer bug fix (exec wrapper removed)
- Kept branch's credential proxy (not OneCLI) and Apple Container
  runtime commands

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 15:42:15 +03:00
gavrielc b341bc1585 chore: remove direct pino/pino-pretty dependency
Pino was replaced with a built-in logger on main. For branches
with baileys (WhatsApp), pino resolves as a transitive dependency
of @whiskeysockets/baileys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-27 22:39:40 +03:00
github-actions[bot] 51e776b286 Merge branch 'main' into skill/apple-container 2026-03-14 15:24:09 +00:00
github-actions[bot] 5a16f98838 Merge branch 'main' into skill/apple-container 2026-03-14 13:16:50 +00:00
github-actions[bot] ed02382e68 Merge branch 'main' into skill/apple-container 2026-03-13 11:59:37 +00:00
github-actions[bot] efab26c97d Merge branch 'main' into skill/apple-container 2026-03-13 11:59:04 +00:00
github-actions[bot] 0432d13617 Merge branch 'main' into skill/apple-container 2026-03-11 10:30:39 +00:00
github-actions[bot] 79ddc47703 Merge branch 'main' into skill/apple-container 2026-03-11 10:25:35 +00:00
github-actions[bot] 90d38388ad Merge branch 'main' into skill/apple-container 2026-03-10 20:59:38 +00:00
github-actions[bot] 5d226ba56c Merge branch 'main' into skill/apple-container 2026-03-10 20:52:02 +00:00
github-actions[bot] 6c8216e255 Merge branch 'main' into skill/apple-container 2026-03-10 20:39:54 +00:00
github-actions[bot] b66b123886 Merge branch 'main' into skill/apple-container 2026-03-10 00:25:36 +00:00
gavrielc b0c2c835ff Merge commit '4cdd09c' into rebuild-fork 2026-03-10 01:15:20 +02:00
gavrielc 4cdd09c45c Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into skill/apple-container
# Conflicts:
#	src/container-runner.ts
2026-03-09 23:20:34 +02:00
gavrielc 2f1933775c Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into skill/apple-container 2026-03-09 00:07:58 +02:00
gavrielc 7c04dafa3d Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into skill/apple-container 2026-03-08 23:24:40 +02:00
gavrielc 0161ba508a skill/apple-container: switch runtime from Docker to Apple Container
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-08 23:18:06 +02:00
16 changed files with 510 additions and 1222 deletions
-153
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@@ -1,153 +0,0 @@
---
name: add-github
description: Add GitHub skill to container agents. Installs gh CLI in the container, passes GITHUB_TOKEN via stdin, and adds the agent-github skill doc so agents can manage issues, PRs, and code review.
---
# Add GitHub Skill
This skill gives container agents access to the GitHub CLI (`gh`) for managing issues, pull requests, and code review.
## Phase 1: Pre-flight
### Check if already applied
Read `.nanoclaw/state.yaml`. If `github` is in `applied_skills`, skip to Phase 3 (Configure). The code changes are already in place.
### Ask the user
Use `AskUserQuestion` to collect the GitHub token:
AskUserQuestion: Do you have a GitHub personal access token, or do you need to create one?
If they have one, collect it now. If not, guide them in Phase 3.
## Phase 2: Apply Code Changes
### Initialize skills system (if needed)
If `.nanoclaw/` directory doesn't exist yet:
```bash
npx tsx scripts/apply-skill.ts --init
```
### Apply the skill
```bash
npx tsx scripts/apply-skill.ts .claude/skills/add-github
```
This deterministically:
- Adds `container/skills/agent-github/SKILL.md` (agent-facing GitHub CLI docs)
- Three-way merges `gh` CLI installation into `container/Dockerfile`
- Three-way merges `GITHUB_TOKEN` and `GH_REPO` into `readSecrets()` in `src/container-runner.ts`
- Records the application in `.nanoclaw/state.yaml`
If the apply reports merge conflicts, read the intent files:
- `modify/container/Dockerfile.intent.md` — what changed for the Dockerfile
- `modify/src/container-runner.ts.intent.md` — what changed for container-runner.ts
### Validate
```bash
npm run build
```
Build must be clean before proceeding.
## Phase 3: Configure Token and Repository
### Step 1: Ask for token or guide creation
Use `AskUserQuestion`:
AskUserQuestion: Do you have a GitHub personal access token already, or do you need to create one?
If they need to create one, tell them:
> Create a GitHub personal access token (classic):
>
> 1. Go to https://github.com/settings/tokens/new
> 2. **Note**: `NanoClaw agent` (or whatever you like)
> 3. **Expiration**: 90 days (recommended) or "No expiration"
> 4. **Scopes**: select `repo` (full repo access — covers issues, PRs, code, status)
> 5. Click **Generate token** and copy it immediately (you can only see it once)
>
> The token will start with `ghp_...`. Paste it here when you have it.
Wait for the user to provide the token.
### Step 2: Ask for target repository
Use `AskUserQuestion`:
AskUserQuestion: Which GitHub repository should the agent manage? (format: `owner/repo`)
### Step 3: Add to `.env`
Add both values to `.env`:
```bash
GITHUB_TOKEN=ghp_...
GH_REPO=owner/repo
```
`GH_REPO` sets the default repository so the agent doesn't need `--repo` on every command.
### Step 4: Sync env and restart
```bash
npm run build
./container/build.sh
rm -r data/sessions/*/agent-runner-src 2>/dev/null || true
launchctl kickstart -k gui/$(id -u)/com.nanoclaw # macOS
# Linux: systemctl --user restart nanoclaw
```
## Phase 4: Verify
### Test the connection
Tell the user:
> GitHub is connected! Send this in your main channel:
>
> "List the open issues on our repo"
The agent should invoke `gh issue list` and return results.
### Check logs if needed
```bash
tail -f logs/nanoclaw.log
```
## Troubleshooting
### gh: not found
The container needs to be rebuilt with the `gh` CLI:
```bash
./container/build.sh
rm -r data/sessions/*/agent-runner-src 2>/dev/null || true
launchctl kickstart -k gui/$(id -u)/com.nanoclaw
```
### gh: authentication required
- Check `GITHUB_TOKEN` is set in `.env`
- Restart NanoClaw
### Rate limit exceeded
GitHub allows 5,000 requests/hour with token auth. If hitting limits, the agent is likely making too many API calls in a loop.
## Removal
1. Delete `container/skills/agent-github/SKILL.md`
2. Remove `gh` installation block from `container/Dockerfile`
3. Remove `GITHUB_TOKEN` and `GH_REPO` from `readSecrets()` in `src/container-runner.ts`
4. Remove `GITHUB_TOKEN` and `GH_REPO` from `.env`
5. Remove `github` from `.nanoclaw/state.yaml`
6. Rebuild: `./container/build.sh && npm run build && launchctl kickstart -k gui/$(id -u)/com.nanoclaw`
@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
---
name: agent-github
description: Manage GitHub issues, pull requests, and code review for the repository. Use for any GitHub task — listing issues, reviewing PRs, checking CI status, adding labels, posting comments.
allowed-tools: Bash(gh:*)
---
# GitHub CLI (`gh`)
## Authentication
`gh` is pre-authenticated via `GITHUB_TOKEN` env var. The target repo is set via `GH_REPO` (e.g., `owner/repo`), so you don't need to specify `--repo` on every command.
## Read operations
### Issues
```bash
gh issue list # Open issues
gh issue list --state closed --limit 10 # Recent closed issues
gh issue list --label "bug" # Filter by label
gh issue list --assignee "@me" # Assigned to me
gh issue list --search "keyword" # Search issues
gh issue view 42 # View issue details
gh issue view 42 --comments # Include comments
```
### Pull requests
```bash
gh pr list # Open PRs
gh pr list --state merged --limit 10 # Recent merged PRs
gh pr list --author "username" # Filter by author
gh pr view 99 # View PR details
gh pr view 99 --comments # Include comments
gh pr diff 99 # View PR diff
gh pr checks 99 # CI/check status
```
### Repository info
```bash
gh api repos/{owner}/{repo}/branches # List branches
gh api repos/{owner}/{repo}/commits?per_page=10 # Recent commits
gh api repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/latest # Latest release
gh api repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs?per_page=5 # Recent workflow runs
```
## Safe write operations
### Issue comments and labels
```bash
gh issue comment 42 --body "Looks good, marking as reviewed."
gh issue edit 42 --add-label "reviewed"
gh issue edit 42 --remove-label "needs-triage"
gh issue edit 42 --add-assignee "username"
```
### PR comments and reviews
```bash
gh pr comment 99 --body "LGTM, one minor suggestion below."
gh pr review 99 --approve --body "Approved."
gh pr review 99 --request-changes --body "Please fix the failing test."
gh pr review 99 --comment --body "Looks good overall."
```
## NOT allowed
Do NOT perform these operations — they are destructive or require human decision:
- `gh pr merge` / `gh pr close` / `gh pr reopen`
- `gh issue create` / `gh issue close` / `gh issue reopen`
- `gh release create` / `gh release delete`
- `gh repo delete` / `gh repo rename`
- `git push --force` / `git push --force-with-lease`
- Any `gh api -X DELETE` call
- Any `gh api -X PUT/PATCH` on branch protection rules
## Tips
- Use `--json` for structured output: `gh issue list --json number,title,labels`
- Combine with `jq` for filtering: `gh pr list --json number,title,checks --jq '.[] | select(.checks | length > 0)'`
- Rate limits: GitHub allows 5,000 requests/hour with token auth — plenty for normal use
- For large lists, use `--limit`: `gh issue list --limit 50`
- To get the repo owner/name: `gh repo view --json nameWithOwner --jq .nameWithOwner`
-17
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@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
skill: github
version: 1.0.0
description: "GitHub CLI skill for container agents"
core_version: 0.1.0
adds:
- container/skills/agent-github/SKILL.md
modifies:
- container/Dockerfile
- src/container-runner.ts
structured:
npm_dependencies: {}
env_additions:
- GITHUB_TOKEN
- GH_REPO
conflicts: []
depends: []
test: "npm run build"
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
# NanoClaw Agent Container
# Runs Claude Agent SDK in isolated Linux VM with browser automation
FROM node:22-slim
# Install system dependencies for Chromium
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y \
chromium \
fonts-liberation \
fonts-noto-cjk \
fonts-noto-color-emoji \
libgbm1 \
libnss3 \
libatk-bridge2.0-0 \
libgtk-3-0 \
libx11-xcb1 \
libxcomposite1 \
libxdamage1 \
libxrandr2 \
libasound2 \
libpangocairo-1.0-0 \
libcups2 \
libdrm2 \
libxshmfence1 \
curl \
git \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Install GitHub CLI
RUN curl -fsSL https://cli.github.com/packages/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg \
-o /usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg \
&& echo "deb [arch=$(dpkg --print-architecture) signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg] https://cli.github.com/packages stable main" \
> /etc/apt/sources.list.d/github-cli.list \
&& apt-get update && apt-get install -y gh \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Set Chromium path for agent-browser
ENV AGENT_BROWSER_EXECUTABLE_PATH=/usr/bin/chromium
ENV PLAYWRIGHT_CHROMIUM_EXECUTABLE_PATH=/usr/bin/chromium
# Install agent-browser and claude-code globally
RUN npm install -g agent-browser @anthropic-ai/claude-code
# Create app directory
WORKDIR /app
# Copy package files first for better caching
COPY agent-runner/package*.json ./
# Install dependencies
RUN npm install
# Copy source code
COPY agent-runner/ ./
# Build TypeScript
RUN npm run build
# Create workspace directories
RUN mkdir -p /workspace/group /workspace/global /workspace/extra /workspace/ipc/messages /workspace/ipc/tasks /workspace/ipc/input
# Create entrypoint script
# Secrets are passed via stdin JSON — temp file is deleted immediately after Node reads it
# Follow-up messages arrive via IPC files in /workspace/ipc/input/
RUN printf '#!/bin/bash\nset -e\ncd /app && npx tsc --outDir /tmp/dist 2>&1 >&2\nln -s /app/node_modules /tmp/dist/node_modules\nchmod -R a-w /tmp/dist\ncat > /tmp/input.json\nnode /tmp/dist/index.js < /tmp/input.json\n' > /app/entrypoint.sh && chmod +x /app/entrypoint.sh
# Set ownership to node user (non-root) for writable directories
RUN chown -R node:node /workspace && chmod 777 /home/node
# Switch to non-root user (required for --dangerously-skip-permissions)
USER node
# Set working directory to group workspace
WORKDIR /workspace/group
# Entry point reads JSON from stdin, outputs JSON to stdout
ENTRYPOINT ["/app/entrypoint.sh"]
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
# Intent: container/Dockerfile modifications
## What changed
Added GitHub CLI (`gh`) installation from GitHub's official apt repository, placed after the existing system dependencies block.
## Key sections
### gh CLI installation
- Added after the `rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*` line that closes the system dependencies block:
```dockerfile
RUN curl -fsSL https://cli.github.com/packages/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg \
-o /usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg \
&& echo "deb [arch=$(dpkg --print-architecture) signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg] https://cli.github.com/packages stable main" \
> /etc/apt/sources.list.d/github-cli.list \
&& apt-get update && apt-get install -y gh \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
```
- Uses the official GitHub apt repo with signed keyring
- Cleans apt lists to minimize image size
## Invariants
- All existing system dependencies (chromium, fonts, curl, git) are unchanged
- The Chromium env vars below are unchanged
- All subsequent steps (npm install, COPY, build, entrypoint) are unchanged
## Must-keep
- The existing `apt-get install` block for system dependencies
- The `AGENT_BROWSER_EXECUTABLE_PATH` and `PLAYWRIGHT_CHROMIUM_EXECUTABLE_PATH` env vars
- The npm global install of `agent-browser` and `@anthropic-ai/claude-code`
- The entire build, COPY, and entrypoint sequence
@@ -1,704 +0,0 @@
/**
* Container Runner for NanoClaw
* Spawns agent execution in containers and handles IPC
*/
import { ChildProcess, exec, spawn } from 'child_process';
import fs from 'fs';
import path from 'path';
import {
CONTAINER_IMAGE,
CONTAINER_MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE,
CONTAINER_TIMEOUT,
DATA_DIR,
GROUPS_DIR,
IDLE_TIMEOUT,
TIMEZONE,
} from './config.js';
import { readEnvFile } from './env.js';
import { resolveGroupFolderPath, resolveGroupIpcPath } from './group-folder.js';
import { logger } from './logger.js';
import {
CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN,
readonlyMountArgs,
stopContainer,
} from './container-runtime.js';
import { validateAdditionalMounts } from './mount-security.js';
import { RegisteredGroup } from './types.js';
// Sentinel markers for robust output parsing (must match agent-runner)
const OUTPUT_START_MARKER = '---NANOCLAW_OUTPUT_START---';
const OUTPUT_END_MARKER = '---NANOCLAW_OUTPUT_END---';
export interface ContainerInput {
prompt: string;
sessionId?: string;
groupFolder: string;
chatJid: string;
isMain: boolean;
isScheduledTask?: boolean;
assistantName?: string;
secrets?: Record<string, string>;
}
export interface ContainerOutput {
status: 'success' | 'error';
result: string | null;
newSessionId?: string;
error?: string;
}
interface VolumeMount {
hostPath: string;
containerPath: string;
readonly: boolean;
}
function buildVolumeMounts(
group: RegisteredGroup,
isMain: boolean,
): VolumeMount[] {
const mounts: VolumeMount[] = [];
const projectRoot = process.cwd();
const groupDir = resolveGroupFolderPath(group.folder);
if (isMain) {
// Main gets the project root read-only. Writable paths the agent needs
// (group folder, IPC, .claude/) are mounted separately below.
// Read-only prevents the agent from modifying host application code
// (src/, dist/, package.json, etc.) which would bypass the sandbox
// entirely on next restart.
mounts.push({
hostPath: projectRoot,
containerPath: '/workspace/project',
readonly: true,
});
// Shadow .env so the agent cannot read secrets from the mounted project root.
// Secrets are passed via stdin instead (see readSecrets()).
const envFile = path.join(projectRoot, '.env');
if (fs.existsSync(envFile)) {
mounts.push({
hostPath: '/dev/null',
containerPath: '/workspace/project/.env',
readonly: true,
});
}
// Main also gets its group folder as the working directory
mounts.push({
hostPath: groupDir,
containerPath: '/workspace/group',
readonly: false,
});
} else {
// Other groups only get their own folder
mounts.push({
hostPath: groupDir,
containerPath: '/workspace/group',
readonly: false,
});
// Global memory directory (read-only for non-main)
// Only directory mounts are supported, not file mounts
const globalDir = path.join(GROUPS_DIR, 'global');
if (fs.existsSync(globalDir)) {
mounts.push({
hostPath: globalDir,
containerPath: '/workspace/global',
readonly: true,
});
}
}
// Per-group Claude sessions directory (isolated from other groups)
// Each group gets their own .claude/ to prevent cross-group session access
const groupSessionsDir = path.join(
DATA_DIR,
'sessions',
group.folder,
'.claude',
);
fs.mkdirSync(groupSessionsDir, { recursive: true });
const settingsFile = path.join(groupSessionsDir, 'settings.json');
if (!fs.existsSync(settingsFile)) {
fs.writeFileSync(
settingsFile,
JSON.stringify(
{
env: {
// Enable agent swarms (subagent orchestration)
// https://code.claude.com/docs/en/agent-teams#orchestrate-teams-of-claude-code-sessions
CLAUDE_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL_AGENT_TEAMS: '1',
// Load CLAUDE.md from additional mounted directories
// https://code.claude.com/docs/en/memory#load-memory-from-additional-directories
CLAUDE_CODE_ADDITIONAL_DIRECTORIES_CLAUDE_MD: '1',
// Enable Claude's memory feature (persists user preferences between sessions)
// https://code.claude.com/docs/en/memory#manage-auto-memory
CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_AUTO_MEMORY: '0',
},
},
null,
2,
) + '\n',
);
}
// Sync skills from container/skills/ into each group's .claude/skills/
const skillsSrc = path.join(process.cwd(), 'container', 'skills');
const skillsDst = path.join(groupSessionsDir, 'skills');
if (fs.existsSync(skillsSrc)) {
for (const skillDir of fs.readdirSync(skillsSrc)) {
const srcDir = path.join(skillsSrc, skillDir);
if (!fs.statSync(srcDir).isDirectory()) continue;
const dstDir = path.join(skillsDst, skillDir);
fs.cpSync(srcDir, dstDir, { recursive: true });
}
}
mounts.push({
hostPath: groupSessionsDir,
containerPath: '/home/node/.claude',
readonly: false,
});
// Per-group IPC namespace: each group gets its own IPC directory
// This prevents cross-group privilege escalation via IPC
const groupIpcDir = resolveGroupIpcPath(group.folder);
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(groupIpcDir, 'messages'), { recursive: true });
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(groupIpcDir, 'tasks'), { recursive: true });
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(groupIpcDir, 'input'), { recursive: true });
mounts.push({
hostPath: groupIpcDir,
containerPath: '/workspace/ipc',
readonly: false,
});
// Copy agent-runner source into a per-group writable location so agents
// can customize it (add tools, change behavior) without affecting other
// groups. Recompiled on container startup via entrypoint.sh.
const agentRunnerSrc = path.join(
projectRoot,
'container',
'agent-runner',
'src',
);
const groupAgentRunnerDir = path.join(
DATA_DIR,
'sessions',
group.folder,
'agent-runner-src',
);
if (!fs.existsSync(groupAgentRunnerDir) && fs.existsSync(agentRunnerSrc)) {
fs.cpSync(agentRunnerSrc, groupAgentRunnerDir, { recursive: true });
}
mounts.push({
hostPath: groupAgentRunnerDir,
containerPath: '/app/src',
readonly: false,
});
// Additional mounts validated against external allowlist (tamper-proof from containers)
if (group.containerConfig?.additionalMounts) {
const validatedMounts = validateAdditionalMounts(
group.containerConfig.additionalMounts,
group.name,
isMain,
);
mounts.push(...validatedMounts);
}
return mounts;
}
/**
* Read allowed secrets from .env for passing to the container via stdin.
* Secrets are never written to disk or mounted as files.
*/
function readSecrets(): Record<string, string> {
return readEnvFile([
'CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN',
'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY',
'ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL',
'ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN',
'GITHUB_TOKEN',
'GH_REPO',
]);
}
function buildContainerArgs(
mounts: VolumeMount[],
containerName: string,
): string[] {
const args: string[] = ['run', '-i', '--rm', '--name', containerName];
// Pass host timezone so container's local time matches the user's
args.push('-e', `TZ=${TIMEZONE}`);
// Run as host user so bind-mounted files are accessible.
// Skip when running as root (uid 0), as the container's node user (uid 1000),
// or when getuid is unavailable (native Windows without WSL).
const hostUid = process.getuid?.();
const hostGid = process.getgid?.();
if (hostUid != null && hostUid !== 0 && hostUid !== 1000) {
args.push('--user', `${hostUid}:${hostGid}`);
args.push('-e', 'HOME=/home/node');
}
for (const mount of mounts) {
if (mount.readonly) {
args.push(...readonlyMountArgs(mount.hostPath, mount.containerPath));
} else {
args.push('-v', `${mount.hostPath}:${mount.containerPath}`);
}
}
args.push(CONTAINER_IMAGE);
return args;
}
export async function runContainerAgent(
group: RegisteredGroup,
input: ContainerInput,
onProcess: (proc: ChildProcess, containerName: string) => void,
onOutput?: (output: ContainerOutput) => Promise<void>,
): Promise<ContainerOutput> {
const startTime = Date.now();
const groupDir = resolveGroupFolderPath(group.folder);
fs.mkdirSync(groupDir, { recursive: true });
const mounts = buildVolumeMounts(group, input.isMain);
const safeName = group.folder.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9-]/g, '-');
const containerName = `nanoclaw-${safeName}-${Date.now()}`;
const containerArgs = buildContainerArgs(mounts, containerName);
logger.debug(
{
group: group.name,
containerName,
mounts: mounts.map(
(m) =>
`${m.hostPath} -> ${m.containerPath}${m.readonly ? ' (ro)' : ''}`,
),
containerArgs: containerArgs.join(' '),
},
'Container mount configuration',
);
logger.info(
{
group: group.name,
containerName,
mountCount: mounts.length,
isMain: input.isMain,
},
'Spawning container agent',
);
const logsDir = path.join(groupDir, 'logs');
fs.mkdirSync(logsDir, { recursive: true });
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const container = spawn(CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN, containerArgs, {
stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
});
onProcess(container, containerName);
let stdout = '';
let stderr = '';
let stdoutTruncated = false;
let stderrTruncated = false;
// Pass secrets via stdin (never written to disk or mounted as files)
input.secrets = readSecrets();
container.stdin.write(JSON.stringify(input));
container.stdin.end();
// Remove secrets from input so they don't appear in logs
delete input.secrets;
// Streaming output: parse OUTPUT_START/END marker pairs as they arrive
let parseBuffer = '';
let newSessionId: string | undefined;
let outputChain = Promise.resolve();
container.stdout.on('data', (data) => {
const chunk = data.toString();
// Always accumulate for logging
if (!stdoutTruncated) {
const remaining = CONTAINER_MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE - stdout.length;
if (chunk.length > remaining) {
stdout += chunk.slice(0, remaining);
stdoutTruncated = true;
logger.warn(
{ group: group.name, size: stdout.length },
'Container stdout truncated due to size limit',
);
} else {
stdout += chunk;
}
}
// Stream-parse for output markers
if (onOutput) {
parseBuffer += chunk;
let startIdx: number;
while ((startIdx = parseBuffer.indexOf(OUTPUT_START_MARKER)) !== -1) {
const endIdx = parseBuffer.indexOf(OUTPUT_END_MARKER, startIdx);
if (endIdx === -1) break; // Incomplete pair, wait for more data
const jsonStr = parseBuffer
.slice(startIdx + OUTPUT_START_MARKER.length, endIdx)
.trim();
parseBuffer = parseBuffer.slice(endIdx + OUTPUT_END_MARKER.length);
try {
const parsed: ContainerOutput = JSON.parse(jsonStr);
if (parsed.newSessionId) {
newSessionId = parsed.newSessionId;
}
hadStreamingOutput = true;
// Activity detected — reset the hard timeout
resetTimeout();
// Call onOutput for all markers (including null results)
// so idle timers start even for "silent" query completions.
outputChain = outputChain.then(() => onOutput(parsed));
} catch (err) {
logger.warn(
{ group: group.name, error: err },
'Failed to parse streamed output chunk',
);
}
}
}
});
container.stderr.on('data', (data) => {
const chunk = data.toString();
const lines = chunk.trim().split('\n');
for (const line of lines) {
if (line) logger.debug({ container: group.folder }, line);
}
// Don't reset timeout on stderr — SDK writes debug logs continuously.
// Timeout only resets on actual output (OUTPUT_MARKER in stdout).
if (stderrTruncated) return;
const remaining = CONTAINER_MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE - stderr.length;
if (chunk.length > remaining) {
stderr += chunk.slice(0, remaining);
stderrTruncated = true;
logger.warn(
{ group: group.name, size: stderr.length },
'Container stderr truncated due to size limit',
);
} else {
stderr += chunk;
}
});
let timedOut = false;
let hadStreamingOutput = false;
const configTimeout = group.containerConfig?.timeout || CONTAINER_TIMEOUT;
// Grace period: hard timeout must be at least IDLE_TIMEOUT + 30s so the
// graceful _close sentinel has time to trigger before the hard kill fires.
const timeoutMs = Math.max(configTimeout, IDLE_TIMEOUT + 30_000);
const killOnTimeout = () => {
timedOut = true;
logger.error(
{ group: group.name, containerName },
'Container timeout, stopping gracefully',
);
exec(stopContainer(containerName), { timeout: 15000 }, (err) => {
if (err) {
logger.warn(
{ group: group.name, containerName, err },
'Graceful stop failed, force killing',
);
container.kill('SIGKILL');
}
});
};
let timeout = setTimeout(killOnTimeout, timeoutMs);
// Reset the timeout whenever there's activity (streaming output)
const resetTimeout = () => {
clearTimeout(timeout);
timeout = setTimeout(killOnTimeout, timeoutMs);
};
container.on('close', (code) => {
clearTimeout(timeout);
const duration = Date.now() - startTime;
if (timedOut) {
const ts = new Date().toISOString().replace(/[:.]/g, '-');
const timeoutLog = path.join(logsDir, `container-${ts}.log`);
fs.writeFileSync(
timeoutLog,
[
`=== Container Run Log (TIMEOUT) ===`,
`Timestamp: ${new Date().toISOString()}`,
`Group: ${group.name}`,
`Container: ${containerName}`,
`Duration: ${duration}ms`,
`Exit Code: ${code}`,
`Had Streaming Output: ${hadStreamingOutput}`,
].join('\n'),
);
// Timeout after output = idle cleanup, not failure.
// The agent already sent its response; this is just the
// container being reaped after the idle period expired.
if (hadStreamingOutput) {
logger.info(
{ group: group.name, containerName, duration, code },
'Container timed out after output (idle cleanup)',
);
outputChain.then(() => {
resolve({
status: 'success',
result: null,
newSessionId,
});
});
return;
}
logger.error(
{ group: group.name, containerName, duration, code },
'Container timed out with no output',
);
resolve({
status: 'error',
result: null,
error: `Container timed out after ${configTimeout}ms`,
});
return;
}
const timestamp = new Date().toISOString().replace(/[:.]/g, '-');
const logFile = path.join(logsDir, `container-${timestamp}.log`);
const isVerbose =
process.env.LOG_LEVEL === 'debug' || process.env.LOG_LEVEL === 'trace';
const logLines = [
`=== Container Run Log ===`,
`Timestamp: ${new Date().toISOString()}`,
`Group: ${group.name}`,
`IsMain: ${input.isMain}`,
`Duration: ${duration}ms`,
`Exit Code: ${code}`,
`Stdout Truncated: ${stdoutTruncated}`,
`Stderr Truncated: ${stderrTruncated}`,
``,
];
const isError = code !== 0;
if (isVerbose || isError) {
logLines.push(
`=== Input ===`,
JSON.stringify(input, null, 2),
``,
`=== Container Args ===`,
containerArgs.join(' '),
``,
`=== Mounts ===`,
mounts
.map(
(m) =>
`${m.hostPath} -> ${m.containerPath}${m.readonly ? ' (ro)' : ''}`,
)
.join('\n'),
``,
`=== Stderr${stderrTruncated ? ' (TRUNCATED)' : ''} ===`,
stderr,
``,
`=== Stdout${stdoutTruncated ? ' (TRUNCATED)' : ''} ===`,
stdout,
);
} else {
logLines.push(
`=== Input Summary ===`,
`Prompt length: ${input.prompt.length} chars`,
`Session ID: ${input.sessionId || 'new'}`,
``,
`=== Mounts ===`,
mounts
.map((m) => `${m.containerPath}${m.readonly ? ' (ro)' : ''}`)
.join('\n'),
``,
);
}
fs.writeFileSync(logFile, logLines.join('\n'));
logger.debug({ logFile, verbose: isVerbose }, 'Container log written');
if (code !== 0) {
logger.error(
{
group: group.name,
code,
duration,
stderr,
stdout,
logFile,
},
'Container exited with error',
);
resolve({
status: 'error',
result: null,
error: `Container exited with code ${code}: ${stderr.slice(-200)}`,
});
return;
}
// Streaming mode: wait for output chain to settle, return completion marker
if (onOutput) {
outputChain.then(() => {
logger.info(
{ group: group.name, duration, newSessionId },
'Container completed (streaming mode)',
);
resolve({
status: 'success',
result: null,
newSessionId,
});
});
return;
}
// Legacy mode: parse the last output marker pair from accumulated stdout
try {
// Extract JSON between sentinel markers for robust parsing
const startIdx = stdout.indexOf(OUTPUT_START_MARKER);
const endIdx = stdout.indexOf(OUTPUT_END_MARKER);
let jsonLine: string;
if (startIdx !== -1 && endIdx !== -1 && endIdx > startIdx) {
jsonLine = stdout
.slice(startIdx + OUTPUT_START_MARKER.length, endIdx)
.trim();
} else {
// Fallback: last non-empty line (backwards compatibility)
const lines = stdout.trim().split('\n');
jsonLine = lines[lines.length - 1];
}
const output: ContainerOutput = JSON.parse(jsonLine);
logger.info(
{
group: group.name,
duration,
status: output.status,
hasResult: !!output.result,
},
'Container completed',
);
resolve(output);
} catch (err) {
logger.error(
{
group: group.name,
stdout,
stderr,
error: err,
},
'Failed to parse container output',
);
resolve({
status: 'error',
result: null,
error: `Failed to parse container output: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
});
}
});
container.on('error', (err) => {
clearTimeout(timeout);
logger.error(
{ group: group.name, containerName, error: err },
'Container spawn error',
);
resolve({
status: 'error',
result: null,
error: `Container spawn error: ${err.message}`,
});
});
});
}
export function writeTasksSnapshot(
groupFolder: string,
isMain: boolean,
tasks: Array<{
id: string;
groupFolder: string;
prompt: string;
schedule_type: string;
schedule_value: string;
status: string;
next_run: string | null;
}>,
): void {
// Write filtered tasks to the group's IPC directory
const groupIpcDir = resolveGroupIpcPath(groupFolder);
fs.mkdirSync(groupIpcDir, { recursive: true });
// Main sees all tasks, others only see their own
const filteredTasks = isMain
? tasks
: tasks.filter((t) => t.groupFolder === groupFolder);
const tasksFile = path.join(groupIpcDir, 'current_tasks.json');
fs.writeFileSync(tasksFile, JSON.stringify(filteredTasks, null, 2));
}
export interface AvailableGroup {
jid: string;
name: string;
lastActivity: string;
isRegistered: boolean;
}
/**
* Write available groups snapshot for the container to read.
* Only main group can see all available groups (for activation).
* Non-main groups only see their own registration status.
*/
export function writeGroupsSnapshot(
groupFolder: string,
isMain: boolean,
groups: AvailableGroup[],
registeredJids: Set<string>,
): void {
const groupIpcDir = resolveGroupIpcPath(groupFolder);
fs.mkdirSync(groupIpcDir, { recursive: true });
// Main sees all groups; others see nothing (they can't activate groups)
const visibleGroups = isMain ? groups : [];
const groupsFile = path.join(groupIpcDir, 'available_groups.json');
fs.writeFileSync(
groupsFile,
JSON.stringify(
{
groups: visibleGroups,
lastSync: new Date().toISOString(),
},
null,
2,
),
);
}
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
# Intent: src/container-runner.ts modifications
## What changed
Added `GITHUB_TOKEN` and `GH_REPO` to the `readSecrets()` allowlist so they are passed to the container via stdin JSON.
## Key sections
### readSecrets()
- Added two keys to the array passed to `readEnvFile()`:
```typescript
function readSecrets(): Record<string, string> {
return readEnvFile([
'CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN',
'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY',
'ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL',
'ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN',
'GITHUB_TOKEN',
'GH_REPO',
]);
}
```
- These values flow via stdin -> `containerInput.secrets` -> `sdkEnv` -> available to Bash
- `GITHUB_TOKEN` and `GH_REPO` are NOT added to `SECRET_ENV_VARS` in agent-runner because `gh` CLI needs them visible in Bash commands
## Invariants
- All existing secrets (`CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`, `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL`, `ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN`) are unchanged
- The stdin-based secret passing flow is unchanged
- No changes to volume mounts, container args, or any other functions
## Must-keep
- All existing volume mounts
- The mount security model
- Container lifecycle (spawn, timeout, output parsing)
- The `buildContainerArgs`, `runContainerAgent`, and all other functions
+4 -5
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ FROM node:22-slim
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y \
chromium \
fonts-liberation \
fonts-noto-cjk \
fonts-noto-color-emoji \
libgbm1 \
libnss3 \
@@ -55,14 +54,14 @@ RUN mkdir -p /workspace/group /workspace/global /workspace/extra /workspace/ipc/
# Container input (prompt, group info) is passed via stdin JSON.
# Credentials are injected by the host's credential proxy — never passed here.
# Follow-up messages arrive via IPC files in /workspace/ipc/input/
RUN printf '#!/bin/bash\nset -e\ncd /app && npx tsc --outDir /tmp/dist 2>&1 >&2\nln -s /app/node_modules /tmp/dist/node_modules\nchmod -R a-w /tmp/dist\ncat > /tmp/input.json\nnode /tmp/dist/index.js < /tmp/input.json\n' > /app/entrypoint.sh && chmod +x /app/entrypoint.sh
# Apple Container only supports directory mounts (VirtioFS), so .env cannot be
# shadowed with a host-side /dev/null file mount. Instead the entrypoint starts
# as root, uses mount --bind to shadow .env, then drops to the host user via setpriv.
RUN printf '#!/bin/bash\nset -e\n\n# Shadow .env so the agent cannot read host secrets (requires root)\nif [ "$(id -u)" = "0" ] && [ -f /workspace/project/.env ]; then\n mount --bind /dev/null /workspace/project/.env\nfi\n\n# Compile agent-runner\ncd /app && npx tsc --outDir /tmp/dist 2>&1 >&2\nln -s /app/node_modules /tmp/dist/node_modules\nchmod -R a-w /tmp/dist\n\n# Capture stdin (secrets JSON) to temp file\ncat > /tmp/input.json\n\n# Drop privileges if running as root (main-group containers)\nif [ "$(id -u)" = "0" ] && [ -n "$RUN_UID" ]; then\n chown "$RUN_UID:$RUN_GID" /tmp/input.json /tmp/dist\n exec setpriv --reuid="$RUN_UID" --regid="$RUN_GID" --clear-groups -- node /tmp/dist/index.js < /tmp/input.json\nfi\n\nexec node /tmp/dist/index.js < /tmp/input.json\n' > /app/entrypoint.sh && chmod +x /app/entrypoint.sh
# Set ownership to node user (non-root) for writable directories
RUN chown -R node:node /workspace && chmod 777 /home/node
# Switch to non-root user (required for --dangerously-skip-permissions)
USER node
# Set working directory to group workspace
WORKDIR /workspace/group
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ cd "$SCRIPT_DIR"
IMAGE_NAME="nanoclaw-agent"
TAG="${1:-latest}"
CONTAINER_RUNTIME="${CONTAINER_RUNTIME:-docker}"
CONTAINER_RUNTIME="${CONTAINER_RUNTIME:-container}"
echo "Building NanoClaw agent container image..."
echo "Image: ${IMAGE_NAME}:${TAG}"
+4
View File
@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ export const CONTAINER_MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE = parseInt(
process.env.CONTAINER_MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE || '10485760',
10,
); // 10MB default
export const CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PORT = parseInt(
process.env.CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PORT || '3001',
10,
);
export const ONECLI_URL =
process.env.ONECLI_URL || envConfig.ONECLI_URL || 'http://localhost:10254';
export const MAX_MESSAGES_PER_PROMPT = Math.max(
+6 -11
View File
@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ vi.mock('./config.js', () => ({
CONTAINER_IMAGE: 'nanoclaw-agent:latest',
CONTAINER_MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE: 10485760,
CONTAINER_TIMEOUT: 1800000, // 30min
CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PORT: 3001,
DATA_DIR: '/tmp/nanoclaw-test-data',
GROUPS_DIR: '/tmp/nanoclaw-test-groups',
IDLE_TIMEOUT: 1800000, // 30min
ONECLI_URL: 'http://localhost:10254',
TIMEZONE: 'America/Los_Angeles',
}));
@@ -53,21 +53,16 @@ vi.mock('./mount-security.js', () => ({
// Mock container-runtime
vi.mock('./container-runtime.js', () => ({
CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN: 'docker',
CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN: 'container',
CONTAINER_HOST_GATEWAY: 'host.docker.internal',
hostGatewayArgs: () => [],
readonlyMountArgs: (h: string, c: string) => ['-v', `${h}:${c}:ro`],
stopContainer: vi.fn(),
}));
// Mock OneCLI SDK
vi.mock('@onecli-sh/sdk', () => ({
OneCLI: class {
applyContainerConfig = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(true);
createAgent = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 'test' });
ensureAgent = vi
.fn()
.mockResolvedValue({ name: 'test', identifier: 'test', created: true });
},
// Mock credential-proxy
vi.mock('./credential-proxy.js', () => ({
detectAuthMode: vi.fn(() => 'api-key'),
}));
// Create a controllable fake ChildProcess
+31 -39
View File
@@ -10,26 +10,25 @@ import {
CONTAINER_IMAGE,
CONTAINER_MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE,
CONTAINER_TIMEOUT,
CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PORT,
DATA_DIR,
GROUPS_DIR,
IDLE_TIMEOUT,
ONECLI_URL,
TIMEZONE,
} from './config.js';
import { resolveGroupFolderPath, resolveGroupIpcPath } from './group-folder.js';
import { logger } from './logger.js';
import {
CONTAINER_HOST_GATEWAY,
CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN,
hostGatewayArgs,
readonlyMountArgs,
stopContainer,
} from './container-runtime.js';
import { OneCLI } from '@onecli-sh/sdk';
import { detectAuthMode } from './credential-proxy.js';
import { validateAdditionalMounts } from './mount-security.js';
import { RegisteredGroup } from './types.js';
const onecli = new OneCLI({ url: ONECLI_URL });
// Sentinel markers for robust output parsing (must match agent-runner)
const OUTPUT_START_MARKER = '---NANOCLAW_OUTPUT_START---';
const OUTPUT_END_MARKER = '---NANOCLAW_OUTPUT_END---';
@@ -78,16 +77,8 @@ function buildVolumeMounts(
readonly: true,
});
// Shadow .env so the agent cannot read secrets from the mounted project root.
// Credentials are injected by the OneCLI gateway, never exposed to containers.
const envFile = path.join(projectRoot, '.env');
if (fs.existsSync(envFile)) {
mounts.push({
hostPath: '/dev/null',
containerPath: '/workspace/project/.env',
readonly: true,
});
}
// .env shadowing is handled inside the container entrypoint via mount --bind
// (Apple Container only supports directory mounts, not file mounts like /dev/null)
// Main also gets its group folder as the working directory
mounts.push({
@@ -223,29 +214,31 @@ function buildVolumeMounts(
return mounts;
}
async function buildContainerArgs(
function buildContainerArgs(
mounts: VolumeMount[],
containerName: string,
agentIdentifier?: string,
): Promise<string[]> {
isMain: boolean,
): string[] {
const args: string[] = ['run', '-i', '--rm', '--name', containerName];
// Pass host timezone so container's local time matches the user's
args.push('-e', `TZ=${TIMEZONE}`);
// OneCLI gateway handles credential injection — containers never see real secrets.
// The gateway intercepts HTTPS traffic and injects API keys or OAuth tokens.
const onecliApplied = await onecli.applyContainerConfig(args, {
addHostMapping: false, // Nanoclaw already handles host gateway
agent: agentIdentifier,
});
if (onecliApplied) {
logger.info({ containerName }, 'OneCLI gateway config applied');
// Route API traffic through the credential proxy (containers never see real secrets)
args.push(
'-e',
`ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=http://${CONTAINER_HOST_GATEWAY}:${CREDENTIAL_PROXY_PORT}`,
);
// Mirror the host's auth method with a placeholder value.
// API key mode: SDK sends x-api-key, proxy replaces with real key.
// OAuth mode: SDK exchanges placeholder token for temp API key,
// proxy injects real OAuth token on that exchange request.
const authMode = detectAuthMode();
if (authMode === 'api-key') {
args.push('-e', 'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=placeholder');
} else {
logger.warn(
{ containerName },
'OneCLI gateway not reachable — container will have no credentials',
);
args.push('-e', 'CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=placeholder');
}
// Runtime-specific args for host gateway resolution
@@ -257,7 +250,14 @@ async function buildContainerArgs(
const hostUid = process.getuid?.();
const hostGid = process.getgid?.();
if (hostUid != null && hostUid !== 0 && hostUid !== 1000) {
args.push('--user', `${hostUid}:${hostGid}`);
if (isMain) {
// Main containers start as root so the entrypoint can mount --bind
// to shadow .env. Privileges are dropped via setpriv in entrypoint.sh.
args.push('-e', `RUN_UID=${hostUid}`);
args.push('-e', `RUN_GID=${hostGid}`);
} else {
args.push('--user', `${hostUid}:${hostGid}`);
}
args.push('-e', 'HOME=/home/node');
}
@@ -288,15 +288,7 @@ export async function runContainerAgent(
const mounts = buildVolumeMounts(group, input.isMain);
const safeName = group.folder.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9-]/g, '-');
const containerName = `nanoclaw-${safeName}-${Date.now()}`;
// Main group uses the default OneCLI agent; others use their own agent.
const agentIdentifier = input.isMain
? undefined
: group.folder.toLowerCase().replace(/_/g, '-');
const containerArgs = await buildContainerArgs(
mounts,
containerName,
agentIdentifier,
);
const containerArgs = buildContainerArgs(mounts, containerName, input.isMain);
logger.debug(
{
+58 -24
View File
@@ -32,9 +32,12 @@ beforeEach(() => {
// --- Pure functions ---
describe('readonlyMountArgs', () => {
it('returns -v flag with :ro suffix', () => {
it('returns --mount flag with type=bind and readonly', () => {
const args = readonlyMountArgs('/host/path', '/container/path');
expect(args).toEqual(['-v', '/host/path:/container/path:ro']);
expect(args).toEqual([
'--mount',
'type=bind,source=/host/path,target=/container/path,readonly',
]);
});
});
@@ -42,14 +45,18 @@ describe('stopContainer', () => {
it('calls docker stop for valid container names', () => {
stopContainer('nanoclaw-test-123');
expect(mockExecSync).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
`${CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN} stop -t 1 nanoclaw-test-123`,
`${CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN} stop nanoclaw-test-123`,
{ stdio: 'pipe' },
);
});
it('rejects names with shell metacharacters', () => {
expect(() => stopContainer('foo; rm -rf /')).toThrow('Invalid container name');
expect(() => stopContainer('foo$(whoami)')).toThrow('Invalid container name');
expect(() => stopContainer('foo; rm -rf /')).toThrow(
'Invalid container name',
);
expect(() => stopContainer('foo$(whoami)')).toThrow(
'Invalid container name',
);
expect(() => stopContainer('foo`id`')).toThrow('Invalid container name');
expect(mockExecSync).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
@@ -64,18 +71,37 @@ describe('ensureContainerRuntimeRunning', () => {
ensureContainerRuntimeRunning();
expect(mockExecSync).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(mockExecSync).toHaveBeenCalledWith(`${CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN} info`, {
stdio: 'pipe',
timeout: 10000,
});
expect(mockExecSync).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
`${CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN} system status`,
{ stdio: 'pipe' },
);
expect(logger.debug).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'Container runtime already running',
);
});
it('throws when docker info fails', () => {
it('auto-starts when system status fails', () => {
// First call (system status) fails
mockExecSync.mockImplementationOnce(() => {
throw new Error('Cannot connect to the Docker daemon');
throw new Error('not running');
});
// Second call (system start) succeeds
mockExecSync.mockReturnValueOnce('');
ensureContainerRuntimeRunning();
expect(mockExecSync).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
expect(mockExecSync).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(
2,
`${CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN} system start`,
{ stdio: 'pipe', timeout: 30000 },
);
expect(logger.info).toHaveBeenCalledWith('Container runtime started');
});
it('throws when both status and start fail', () => {
mockExecSync.mockImplementation(() => {
throw new Error('failed');
});
expect(() => ensureContainerRuntimeRunning()).toThrow(
@@ -88,36 +114,40 @@ describe('ensureContainerRuntimeRunning', () => {
// --- cleanupOrphans ---
describe('cleanupOrphans', () => {
it('stops orphaned nanoclaw containers', () => {
// docker ps returns container names, one per line
mockExecSync.mockReturnValueOnce(
'nanoclaw-group1-111\nnanoclaw-group2-222\n',
);
it('stops orphaned nanoclaw containers from JSON output', () => {
// Apple Container ls returns JSON
const lsOutput = JSON.stringify([
{ status: 'running', configuration: { id: 'nanoclaw-group1-111' } },
{ status: 'stopped', configuration: { id: 'nanoclaw-group2-222' } },
{ status: 'running', configuration: { id: 'nanoclaw-group3-333' } },
{ status: 'running', configuration: { id: 'other-container' } },
]);
mockExecSync.mockReturnValueOnce(lsOutput);
// stop calls succeed
mockExecSync.mockReturnValue('');
cleanupOrphans();
// ps + 2 stop calls
// ls + 2 stop calls (only running nanoclaw- containers)
expect(mockExecSync).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(3);
expect(mockExecSync).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(
2,
`${CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN} stop -t 1 nanoclaw-group1-111`,
`${CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN} stop nanoclaw-group1-111`,
{ stdio: 'pipe' },
);
expect(mockExecSync).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(
3,
`${CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN} stop -t 1 nanoclaw-group2-222`,
`${CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN} stop nanoclaw-group3-333`,
{ stdio: 'pipe' },
);
expect(logger.info).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
{ count: 2, names: ['nanoclaw-group1-111', 'nanoclaw-group2-222'] },
{ count: 2, names: ['nanoclaw-group1-111', 'nanoclaw-group3-333'] },
'Stopped orphaned containers',
);
});
it('does nothing when no orphans exist', () => {
mockExecSync.mockReturnValueOnce('');
mockExecSync.mockReturnValueOnce('[]');
cleanupOrphans();
@@ -125,9 +155,9 @@ describe('cleanupOrphans', () => {
expect(logger.info).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('warns and continues when ps fails', () => {
it('warns and continues when ls fails', () => {
mockExecSync.mockImplementationOnce(() => {
throw new Error('docker not available');
throw new Error('container not available');
});
cleanupOrphans(); // should not throw
@@ -139,7 +169,11 @@ describe('cleanupOrphans', () => {
});
it('continues stopping remaining containers when one stop fails', () => {
mockExecSync.mockReturnValueOnce('nanoclaw-a-1\nnanoclaw-b-2\n');
const lsOutput = JSON.stringify([
{ status: 'running', configuration: { id: 'nanoclaw-a-1' } },
{ status: 'running', configuration: { id: 'nanoclaw-b-2' } },
]);
mockExecSync.mockReturnValueOnce(lsOutput);
// First stop fails
mockExecSync.mockImplementationOnce(() => {
throw new Error('already stopped');
+89 -41
View File
@@ -3,12 +3,46 @@
* All runtime-specific logic lives here so swapping runtimes means changing one file.
*/
import { execSync } from 'child_process';
import fs from 'fs';
import os from 'os';
import { logger } from './logger.js';
/** The container runtime binary name. */
export const CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN = 'docker';
export const CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN = 'container';
/**
* IP address containers use to reach the host machine.
* Apple Container VMs use a bridge network (192.168.64.x); the host is at the gateway.
* Detected from the bridge0 interface, falling back to 192.168.64.1.
*/
export const CONTAINER_HOST_GATEWAY = detectHostGateway();
function detectHostGateway(): string {
// Apple Container on macOS: containers reach the host via the bridge network gateway
const ifaces = os.networkInterfaces();
const bridge = ifaces['bridge100'] || ifaces['bridge0'];
if (bridge) {
const ipv4 = bridge.find((a) => a.family === 'IPv4');
if (ipv4) return ipv4.address;
}
// Fallback: Apple Container's default gateway
return '192.168.64.1';
}
/**
* Address the credential proxy binds to.
* Must be set via CREDENTIAL_PROXY_HOST in .env — there is no safe default
* for Apple Container because bridge100 only exists while containers run,
* but the proxy must start before any container.
* The /convert-to-apple-container skill sets this during setup.
*/
export const PROXY_BIND_HOST = process.env.CREDENTIAL_PROXY_HOST;
if (!PROXY_BIND_HOST) {
throw new Error(
'CREDENTIAL_PROXY_HOST is not set in .env. Run /convert-to-apple-container to configure.',
);
}
/** CLI args needed for the container to resolve the host gateway. */
export function hostGatewayArgs(): string[] {
@@ -24,7 +58,10 @@ export function readonlyMountArgs(
hostPath: string,
containerPath: string,
): string[] {
return ['-v', `${hostPath}:${containerPath}:ro`];
return [
'--mount',
`type=bind,source=${hostPath},target=${containerPath},readonly`,
];
}
/** Stop a container by name. Uses execFileSync to avoid shell injection. */
@@ -32,57 +69,68 @@ export function stopContainer(name: string): void {
if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]*$/.test(name)) {
throw new Error(`Invalid container name: ${name}`);
}
execSync(`${CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN} stop -t 1 ${name}`, { stdio: 'pipe' });
execSync(`${CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN} stop ${name}`, { stdio: 'pipe' });
}
/** Ensure the container runtime is running, starting it if needed. */
export function ensureContainerRuntimeRunning(): void {
try {
execSync(`${CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN} info`, {
stdio: 'pipe',
timeout: 10000,
});
execSync(`${CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN} system status`, { stdio: 'pipe' });
logger.debug('Container runtime already running');
} catch (err) {
logger.error({ err }, 'Failed to reach container runtime');
console.error(
'\n╔════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗',
);
console.error(
'║ FATAL: Container runtime failed to start ║',
);
console.error(
'║ ║',
);
console.error(
'║ Agents cannot run without a container runtime. To fix: ║',
);
console.error(
'║ 1. Ensure Docker is installed and running ║',
);
console.error(
'║ 2. Run: docker info ║',
);
console.error(
'║ 3. Restart NanoClaw ║',
);
console.error(
'╚════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝\n',
);
throw new Error('Container runtime is required but failed to start', {
cause: err,
});
} catch {
logger.info('Starting container runtime...');
try {
execSync(`${CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN} system start`, {
stdio: 'pipe',
timeout: 30000,
});
logger.info('Container runtime started');
} catch (err) {
logger.error({ err }, 'Failed to start container runtime');
console.error(
'\n╔════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗',
);
console.error(
'║ FATAL: Container runtime failed to start ║',
);
console.error(
'║ ║',
);
console.error(
'║ Agents cannot run without a container runtime. To fix: ║',
);
console.error(
'║ 1. Ensure Apple Container is installed ║',
);
console.error(
'║ 2. Run: container system start ║',
);
console.error(
'║ 3. Restart NanoClaw ║',
);
console.error(
'╚════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝\n',
);
throw new Error('Container runtime is required but failed to start');
}
}
}
/** Kill orphaned NanoClaw containers from previous runs. */
export function cleanupOrphans(): void {
try {
const output = execSync(
`${CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN} ps --filter name=nanoclaw- --format '{{.Names}}'`,
{ stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'], encoding: 'utf-8' },
);
const orphans = output.trim().split('\n').filter(Boolean);
const output = execSync(`${CONTAINER_RUNTIME_BIN} ls --format json`, {
stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
encoding: 'utf-8',
});
const containers: { status: string; configuration: { id: string } }[] =
JSON.parse(output || '[]');
const orphans = containers
.filter(
(c) =>
c.status === 'running' && c.configuration.id.startsWith('nanoclaw-'),
)
.map((c) => c.configuration.id);
for (const name of orphans) {
try {
stopContainer(name);
+192
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach, vi } from 'vitest';
import http from 'http';
import type { AddressInfo } from 'net';
const mockEnv: Record<string, string> = {};
vi.mock('./env.js', () => ({
readEnvFile: vi.fn(() => ({ ...mockEnv })),
}));
vi.mock('./logger.js', () => ({
logger: { info: vi.fn(), error: vi.fn(), debug: vi.fn(), warn: vi.fn() },
}));
import { startCredentialProxy } from './credential-proxy.js';
function makeRequest(
port: number,
options: http.RequestOptions,
body = '',
): Promise<{
statusCode: number;
body: string;
headers: http.IncomingHttpHeaders;
}> {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const req = http.request(
{ ...options, hostname: '127.0.0.1', port },
(res) => {
const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
res.on('data', (c) => chunks.push(c));
res.on('end', () => {
resolve({
statusCode: res.statusCode!,
body: Buffer.concat(chunks).toString(),
headers: res.headers,
});
});
},
);
req.on('error', reject);
req.write(body);
req.end();
});
}
describe('credential-proxy', () => {
let proxyServer: http.Server;
let upstreamServer: http.Server;
let proxyPort: number;
let upstreamPort: number;
let lastUpstreamHeaders: http.IncomingHttpHeaders;
beforeEach(async () => {
lastUpstreamHeaders = {};
upstreamServer = http.createServer((req, res) => {
lastUpstreamHeaders = { ...req.headers };
res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify({ ok: true }));
});
await new Promise<void>((resolve) =>
upstreamServer.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve),
);
upstreamPort = (upstreamServer.address() as AddressInfo).port;
});
afterEach(async () => {
await new Promise<void>((r) => proxyServer?.close(() => r()));
await new Promise<void>((r) => upstreamServer?.close(() => r()));
for (const key of Object.keys(mockEnv)) delete mockEnv[key];
});
async function startProxy(env: Record<string, string>): Promise<number> {
Object.assign(mockEnv, env, {
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: `http://127.0.0.1:${upstreamPort}`,
});
proxyServer = await startCredentialProxy(0);
return (proxyServer.address() as AddressInfo).port;
}
it('API-key mode injects x-api-key and strips placeholder', async () => {
proxyPort = await startProxy({ ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: 'sk-ant-real-key' });
await makeRequest(
proxyPort,
{
method: 'POST',
path: '/v1/messages',
headers: {
'content-type': 'application/json',
'x-api-key': 'placeholder',
},
},
'{}',
);
expect(lastUpstreamHeaders['x-api-key']).toBe('sk-ant-real-key');
});
it('OAuth mode replaces Authorization when container sends one', async () => {
proxyPort = await startProxy({
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN: 'real-oauth-token',
});
await makeRequest(
proxyPort,
{
method: 'POST',
path: '/api/oauth/claude_cli/create_api_key',
headers: {
'content-type': 'application/json',
authorization: 'Bearer placeholder',
},
},
'{}',
);
expect(lastUpstreamHeaders['authorization']).toBe(
'Bearer real-oauth-token',
);
});
it('OAuth mode does not inject Authorization when container omits it', async () => {
proxyPort = await startProxy({
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN: 'real-oauth-token',
});
// Post-exchange: container uses x-api-key only, no Authorization header
await makeRequest(
proxyPort,
{
method: 'POST',
path: '/v1/messages',
headers: {
'content-type': 'application/json',
'x-api-key': 'temp-key-from-exchange',
},
},
'{}',
);
expect(lastUpstreamHeaders['x-api-key']).toBe('temp-key-from-exchange');
expect(lastUpstreamHeaders['authorization']).toBeUndefined();
});
it('strips hop-by-hop headers', async () => {
proxyPort = await startProxy({ ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: 'sk-ant-real-key' });
await makeRequest(
proxyPort,
{
method: 'POST',
path: '/v1/messages',
headers: {
'content-type': 'application/json',
connection: 'keep-alive',
'keep-alive': 'timeout=5',
'transfer-encoding': 'chunked',
},
},
'{}',
);
// Proxy strips client hop-by-hop headers. Node's HTTP client may re-add
// its own Connection header (standard HTTP/1.1 behavior), but the client's
// custom keep-alive and transfer-encoding must not be forwarded.
expect(lastUpstreamHeaders['keep-alive']).toBeUndefined();
expect(lastUpstreamHeaders['transfer-encoding']).toBeUndefined();
});
it('returns 502 when upstream is unreachable', async () => {
Object.assign(mockEnv, {
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: 'sk-ant-real-key',
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL: 'http://127.0.0.1:59999',
});
proxyServer = await startCredentialProxy(0);
proxyPort = (proxyServer.address() as AddressInfo).port;
const res = await makeRequest(
proxyPort,
{
method: 'POST',
path: '/v1/messages',
headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },
},
'{}',
);
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(502);
expect(res.body).toBe('Bad Gateway');
});
});
+125
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
/**
* Credential proxy for container isolation.
* Containers connect here instead of directly to the Anthropic API.
* The proxy injects real credentials so containers never see them.
*
* Two auth modes:
* API key: Proxy injects x-api-key on every request.
* OAuth: Container CLI exchanges its placeholder token for a temp
* API key via /api/oauth/claude_cli/create_api_key.
* Proxy injects real OAuth token on that exchange request;
* subsequent requests carry the temp key which is valid as-is.
*/
import { createServer, Server } from 'http';
import { request as httpsRequest } from 'https';
import { request as httpRequest, RequestOptions } from 'http';
import { readEnvFile } from './env.js';
import { logger } from './logger.js';
export type AuthMode = 'api-key' | 'oauth';
export interface ProxyConfig {
authMode: AuthMode;
}
export function startCredentialProxy(
port: number,
host = '127.0.0.1',
): Promise<Server> {
const secrets = readEnvFile([
'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY',
'CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN',
'ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN',
'ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL',
]);
const authMode: AuthMode = secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY ? 'api-key' : 'oauth';
const oauthToken =
secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN || secrets.ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN;
const upstreamUrl = new URL(
secrets.ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL || 'https://api.anthropic.com',
);
const isHttps = upstreamUrl.protocol === 'https:';
const makeRequest = isHttps ? httpsRequest : httpRequest;
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const server = createServer((req, res) => {
const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
req.on('data', (c) => chunks.push(c));
req.on('end', () => {
const body = Buffer.concat(chunks);
const headers: Record<string, string | number | string[] | undefined> =
{
...(req.headers as Record<string, string>),
host: upstreamUrl.host,
'content-length': body.length,
};
// Strip hop-by-hop headers that must not be forwarded by proxies
delete headers['connection'];
delete headers['keep-alive'];
delete headers['transfer-encoding'];
if (authMode === 'api-key') {
// API key mode: inject x-api-key on every request
delete headers['x-api-key'];
headers['x-api-key'] = secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY;
} else {
// OAuth mode: replace placeholder Bearer token with the real one
// only when the container actually sends an Authorization header
// (exchange request + auth probes). Post-exchange requests use
// x-api-key only, so they pass through without token injection.
if (headers['authorization']) {
delete headers['authorization'];
if (oauthToken) {
headers['authorization'] = `Bearer ${oauthToken}`;
}
}
}
const upstream = makeRequest(
{
hostname: upstreamUrl.hostname,
port: upstreamUrl.port || (isHttps ? 443 : 80),
path: req.url,
method: req.method,
headers,
} as RequestOptions,
(upRes) => {
res.writeHead(upRes.statusCode!, upRes.headers);
upRes.pipe(res);
},
);
upstream.on('error', (err) => {
logger.error(
{ err, url: req.url },
'Credential proxy upstream error',
);
if (!res.headersSent) {
res.writeHead(502);
res.end('Bad Gateway');
}
});
upstream.write(body);
upstream.end();
});
});
server.listen(port, host, () => {
logger.info({ port, host, authMode }, 'Credential proxy started');
resolve(server);
});
server.on('error', reject);
});
}
/** Detect which auth mode the host is configured for. */
export function detectAuthMode(): AuthMode {
const secrets = readEnvFile(['ANTHROPIC_API_KEY']);
return secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY ? 'api-key' : 'oauth';
}